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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Wholesale auto auctions are convenient structures for economists as they attempt to 
observe the marginal effects of quality changes on the market-clearing price. However, what may 
be categorized as a quality change might rather be a market signal of an environment with 
adverse selection. This dissertation analyzes the effects of seller type and tests their sensitivity to 
econometric model specification. 
  General hedonic attributes and their various applications are reviewed. This 
dissertation explores the basic auto auction environment and dispels inaccurate notions 
about the auction structure. Following Bartik’s (1987) analysis, multi-market data are 
used to produce hedonic estimates for seller, mileage and other attributes. A section is 
devoted to the peculiarities of the auction environment; namely, the winner’s curse, 
adverse selection, and variations in auction structure. 
A three-part literature review covers adverse selection, the various technicalities of 
auction structure, and the econometric issues regarding hedonic regressions. A section presents 
the data and the econometric models with their results. Concluding remarks discuss areas for 
further research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Hedonic pricing models attempt to disaggregate the overall market price of a good into 
the separate implicit prices for the individual characteristics of that particular good.  A helpful 
application of a hedonic pricing method is in the housing market where the price of a property is 
determined by house characteristics such as size, appearance, features and conditions.  It also 
includes surrounding characteristics of the neighborhood of the house such as accessibility to 
schools and value of other homes.  A hedonic pricing model is used to estimate the extent to 
which each factor affects the price. Most goods and services are the sum of many parts but the 
observable market price is only for the aggregated good or service. Therefore, a method must be 
developed to estimate the market value for a sub-feature or component that is not market-traded 
as an individual product.1  
 
Preliminary Comments on Hedonic Pricing 
The basic foundation for hedonic pricing analysis was published by Griliches (1967, 
1971) and Rosen (1974). However, earlier analysis of a hedonic model was conducted by Court 
(1939) who was interested in modeling automobile prices to include a change in features and 
quality.  To capture the value of the individual characteristics of a particular good, analysts 
estimate the shadow prices and then produce parameter estimates, which reveal the marginal 
value of those characteristics. Both the econometric and theoretical issues with hedonic models 
are not trivial.  
                                               
1
 The modeling challenge is compounded due to the nature of intangible characteristics.  
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Practical Use of Hedonic Pricing by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) employs hedonic pricing in several categories 
within the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Since October 2000, BLS has applied a hedonic approach 
to create a quality adjustment in two items of the Major Appliances category of the CPI. The BLS 
also continues to apply a hedonic approach to other items in the CPI, including the Electronic 
Products category and the Educational Books and Supplies category.2 The driving force behind 
this additional reporting of the BLS has been the need to adjust for changes in quality over time. 
Without this adjustment, changes in quality over time could magnify a bias in any price index. 
Merely comparing last year’s prices with this year’s prices might not measure pure price changes 
since this year’s products may be “new and improved.”3 Hedonic analysis, which is rooted in 
Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy, parses out quality improvements to yield a price 
estimate that is not affected by changes in individual characteristics. 
 
Other Applications 
 Hedonic models have various forms and applications. Ward and Ireland (1996) introduce 
hedonic modeling to the valuation of life estimates for litigation cases. Brown and Rosen (1987) 
apply a hedonic model to optimal job choices. In particular, they model the effects of taxes on 
various job packages. In a more novel paper, Goram (1980) gives a hedonic procedure for testing 
quality differentials in the Iowan egg market. He postulates that there are premium quality eggs 
for direct eating, poor quality eggs for strictly baking and medium-grade eggs for miscellaneous 
use. Combris, et al. (1997) conclude that the market price of Bordeaux wine is mainly explained 
                                               
2
 July 2000 BLS news release 
3
 There is a humorous illustration of this bias in price indices written by financial advisor, Scott Burns. In 
his September 4, 2001 article for the Dallas Morning News, entitled “The Hedonic Porsche,” he compares 
his brand new VW Beetle with a 1965 Porsche 356 Carrera, which was his dream car when the Porsche 
was initially introduced to the market. In the end, the Beetle costs seventy five percent of the inflation-
adjusted price of the Carrera while at the same time, the Beetle has more horsepower, better acceleration, 
power controls, air conditioning and various safety features that were nonexistent in 1965.  
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by the information that is printed on the label of the bottle. As will be shown later, their analysis 
is particularly relevant to this research, since their empirical evidence suggests that the variables 
that explain quality levels as defined by professional wine tasters do not influence market price. 
Rather, the labeling on the wine explains most of the price variability, as crucial information such 
as vintage year, vineyard, and grape type are all revealed on the label. The crux of the matter is 
the availability of information and the level of correlation between label and taste. As detailed in 
Rosen’s (1974) seminal paper, a competitive market allows consumers to make decisions based 
on perfect, costless information. In the case of wine then, the label information and taste would be 
intricately tied together. 
 
Research Approach 
 The purpose of this empirical research is to estimate the market valuation for specific 
characteristics in the auto auction environment. Specifically, this dissertation tests for a potential 
premium realized by one type of seller over another and investigates whether this premium is 
caused by an exaggerated lemon problem allegedly created in the auction environment. This 
research also focuses on the interaction effects between seller type and age, and seller type and 
mileage, of the vehicle. Regression results show whether this information is significant in the 
model.4 
A hedonic model provides the framework for this experiment. The hedonic model is 
applied to multi-market data in an effort to produce unbiased estimates. To minimize the noise of 
extraneous variables, the ownership analysis is limited in scope to certain Ford models. The 
approach will be defended later in Chapter Four. 
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 See details in the Model section. 
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 Various issues are intertwined within the ensuing chapters; hence, the literature review 
and the modeling sections need to address the following three areas: adverse selection, general 
auction structures, and hedonic regression analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
 This chapter is divided into three sections with the objective of laying a stable foundation 
for the model that follows in Chapter Four. Although this paper’s contribution to the research is 
the analysis of the seller-type premium or discount, the model will be less meaningful without a 
cursory presentation of the issues surrounding asymmetric information, auction structure and 
hedonic regression models. Therefore, the next three sections contain pertinent discussions that 
support the descriptive nature of the empirical results found in Chapter Four. 
  
Adverse Selection and the Lemon Problem 
 Akerlof (1970) provides the most common framework for the discussion of adverse 
selection. His pivotal paper, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism,” illustrates adverse selection with a hypothetical world containing only four possible 
categories of cars: a well-performing new car, a poor-performing new car, a well-performing used 
car, and a poor-performing used car. Assuming that a buyer cannot distinguish a “lemon” from a 
“peach,” both subsets of cars will be priced the same. As the owner gets to know his car, a 
disparity of information about the car builds up. When the owner becomes a seller, he now has 
more information than the buyer so is incentivized to sell his lemon at the market-clearing price 
of good cars. 5 The replacement within marketplace of the “good” by the “bad” is the precise 
argument behind the aggregate social costs of corrupt and dishonest market participants. If those 
selling the “lemons” continue to capitalize on the ignorance of the buyer, the extent of lemon-
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 The lower quality vehicle eventually takes over the market because both good and bad will sell at the 
same price since the buyer does not have enough information to distinguish between the two types of 
vehicles.  
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dealing could potentially cause the market to completely dry up. There are various forms of 
controlling and limiting the detrimental effects of the oft-cited “lemon problem.” Once such 
control is the practice of a seller instituting a guarantee policy. This puts responsibility on the 
seller for the quality of the product, thus, removing some of the risk from the potentially 
uninformed buyer.6 In relation to the various types of auctions, there are some opportunities for 
the auction buyer to lower his risk and make more informed choices. One such opportunity, as 
practiced in some auto auction houses, is the post-sale inspection by independent auto mechanics. 
These mechanics do not work for the people who are selling the vehicles; rather, the mechanics 
work for the auction house. The mechanics are incentivized for the buyer to have a pleasant 
auction experience in hopes of turning the buyer into a repeat customer.  
However, the tools to counteract asymmetric information might be abused. Akerlof’s 
paper may be summarized by the following main points: first, one side of the market has more 
information than the other side; second, both buyers and sellers desire to maximize consumer and 
producer surplus, respectively; third, price is not necessarily determined by the one who has more 
information, and fourth, the costly structure of warranties, guarantees, and reputations may not 
fully dispel uncertainty. Akerlof (1976) later addresses the tendency for the market to create 
“supergames”, the environment where sellers over-invest in brand names, whether or not the 
product is truly of high quality. 
 Akerlof’s research inspired Bond (1982) to test the lemon problem with data from the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s 1977 Truck Inventory and Use (TIU) Survey.7 Bond’s interest lies in 
modeling vehicle maintenance and comparing these levels of maintenance for a used truck 
                                               
6
 Akerlof (1970) also cites brand names and chain stores as ways for the seller to communicate to the buyer 
that there is partial protection from the potential problem from imperfect information. 
 
7
 The following internet link reveals the latest survey: 
http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/vius/products.html as of December 3, 2008. 
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relative to a newer truck. (A tangent of his research would be the interaction of maintenance 
levels and public information reports, such as CarFax, where independent statements on past 
history are recorded.8) Bond’s assumption is that frequency of  maintenance needs reveal the true 
quality of the vehicle. A lemon would need a lot more work done on it than a good quality 
vehicle. The asymmetry lies in the fact that the prospective buyer knows less about the vehicle 
maintenance history than the seller. Bond develops a logit model that describes the relationship 
between mileage and maintenance: 
 
 Ln[Pi/(1-Pi)] = αi + βix + ε  (2.1) 
where Pi is the probability of maintenance levels on the ith truck (either used or new) and x is 
total mileage. This model has value when vehicle age, mileage, or other relevant variables are 
unavailable. The test for evidence of the lemon uses a separate estimation of Equation (2.1) for 
trucks bought new and for trucks bought used.  If the lemon hypothesis were true in this market, 
then the majority of vehicles that come to market are the ones that need higher levels of 
maintenance. Those vehicles that were true “peaches” would not find themselves for sale. Bond 
finds no difference between maintenance levels on new and used trucks. His research, then, does 
not support the lemon model assumption that a used truck maintenance level would be greater 
than a new truck maintenance level.  One caveat to Bond’s model is that he did not have the 
actual nominal amount of the maintenance costs as reported by the Truck Inventory and Use 
Survey. Clearly, the extent of the maintenance serviced on the vehicle is a factor in vehicle 
quality. 
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 Auto dealers know that a used vehicle will sell more quickly if the vehicle has maintenance records or a 
history report. 
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The conclusion stated by Bond (1982) generated a number of responses including Pratt 
and Hoffer (1984) and Kim (1985). Bond (1984) replied to some of the concerns and 
consequently, produced another updated model as follows: 
 
 Ln[Pi/(1-Pi)] = αi + β1AGE + β2LM + β3TRADED + ε  (2.2) 
 
where Pi is the probability of maintenance on type i (used or new), LM is the log of total mileage, 
TRADED is a dummy variable for the vehicle which was bought used within the last year. If β3 is 
significantly positive, then the author found that a used vehicle has a lower quality for reasons 
other than age and lifetime mileage. Bond (1984) criticized the Pratt and Hoffer paper (1984) for 
not accounting for age differences and for including older model type trucks, resulting in 
potentially biased results. The data show that trucks older than ten years when traded will have 
higher maintenance needs but also will more likely be traded between two private parties. Bond 
(1984) asserts that trucks less than ten years old are most likely sold by actual retail dealers and 
fewer differences exist between the new and used vehicles. 
 Kim (1985) adds additional characteristics to the Akerlof model. The used vehicle market 
is unique in that a car owner can easily switch between the demand side and the supply side of the 
equation. This is not always the case in other markets. Kim takes the insurance market for 
an example. It makes little sense to suggest that an individual can be both one who needs 
insurance and one who supplies insurance. Another example is in the job market: an 
employee cannot easily switch to become the employer. So unlike other markets, each 
individual car owner can choose on which side of the market transaction to position 
himself. Also, Kim includes the quality of the vehicle in his model as one of the variables that 
affect price, rather than maintaining it as exogenous to the model. Vehicle quality is not only a 
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function of inherent characteristics of production but also of the level of care provided by the 
owner. Kim presents a multi-period model where quality is a function of maintenance during 
period one (when it is new) but not during period two (when it is used). An individual can buy a 
new car, a used car, or no car. In this model, the lemon problem potentially may not be accurately 
modeled since the quality of the used vehicle is solely determined by how much maintenance was 
performed in the previous period, and owners with higher preferences for “quality” select higher 
maintenance levels. Again, the unique contributions of Kim (1985) were to allow the individual 
the ability to choose to be either a buyer or a seller and to align himself accordingly and to allow 
vehicle quality to be an endogenous variable in his model.9 Additionally, the Akerlof model has 
homogeneous seller preferences, while Kim introduced sellers who have varying degrees of car-
quality preferences. That is, there are some owners who obtain more utility (or less disutility) 
from more maintenance than other owners. 
 Wilson (1980) provides a segue into the auction structure by introducing a modification 
to Akerlof and by introducing the presence of an auctioneer who brokers the sale. Within his 
model of the auction environment, he examines the price function allowing for three possible 
scenarios. The three scenarios vary with differing individuals who are setting the initial price. 
These individuals are the auctioneer, the buyer, and the seller.  
 
Auction Structure 
Since this thesis assumes the auction structure as given and does not delve into the 
optimal auction structure, this section will be limited to a general presentation of various auction 
                                               
9
 The Akerlof model has vehicle quality as an independent variable; the quality level of the vehicle is 
merely a given. There are no measures for owner-treatment, which would affect quality at the time of sale. 
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structures. The four basic types of auctions are the English auction, the Dutch auction, the First-
price Sealed-bid auction, and the Second-price Sealed-bid auction.10 
 In the English auction, the price is successively raised until only one top bidder remains 
in the bidding process. The distinguishing feature is that each auction participant is fully aware of 
the current highest bid and the price goes higher as the auction process continues. The bidding 
can take place with an auctioneer announcing the bids, the buyers announcing the bids 
themselves, or the auction house displaying the highest bid. The winning bidder pays highest 
valuation. The weakness with this structure is that it is possible for bidders to form “auction 
rings” which are ways to collude on price. An auction ring is a group of bidders who have 
previously made agreements in order to limit any competition against them. By strategizing 
beforehand, the bidders could theoretically select a designated winner by whoever has the highest 
valuation. Graham and Marshall (1987) proposed a structure that would have the designated 
winner distribute side-payments to member of the rink in the amount of the difference between 
the winning bid and the second highest bid. These payments must be made to stall any estimated 
incentives to cheat during the auction process as auction competitors could move into the rink 
leader’s position. The success of the ring hinges on the degree of control by the ring, a stable 
reserve price, and the right level of side-payments. In this structure, the designated bidder is 
attempting to place his bid near the seller’s reserve price,11 while all other bidders in the ring will 
abstain from bidding. However, this structure is not self-enforcing since those not bidding could 
gain by bidding slightly higher than the designated bidder since the auction reserve price could be 
lower than the second-highest valuation. A fluctuating reserve price will likely break down this 
attempt to collude. But, Graham and Marshall find that in an English auction, the non-designated 
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 The data set for this research were taken from English auctions, specifically Manheim Auto Auctions, 
which are located throughout the United States.  
11
 The reserve price is the minimum price that a seller will accept for his product. 
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winner of the ring has no incentive to break any pre-auction agreement since he will not want to 
bid higher than the designated winner. This is not the case in the Dutch auction, as discussed 
next.12 
 The converse of the English auction is the Dutch auction, where bids are descending.13 
As in the Netherlands’ flower auctions, the auctioneer gradually lowers the price until there is one 
bidder who accepts the price. From the seller’s point of view, the Dutch auction may be preferred 
over the English auction because the English auction may allow the winning bidder to pay a price 
higher than his valuation price. A bidder in a Dutch auction could end up bidding closer to his 
valuation price because he would be less inclined to wait before he enters the bidding process. 
There certainly is a ‘time’ component to the bidder’s decision process. 
The First-price Sealed-bid auction requires each potential buyer to submit a one-time, 
sealed bid, and the highest bidder is awarded the auctioned object. The unique characteristic of 
this process is that each bidder is unaware of the other bidders’ amounts and cannot revise their 
first amount. After this first stage, there may be a second “resolution” stage of bidding if there are 
two or more high bidders. Before 1993, the U.S. Treasury had used this type of auction structure. 
However, Milton Friedman was influential in showing that this type of structure was subject to 
collusion.14 
 The fourth main structure is the Second-price Sealed bid auction, also known as the 
Vickrey auction or Uniform-Priced auction, where there are multiple units of the same item on 
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 The auctioneer may begin to “pull bids off the chandelier”  in an attempt to limit collusive behavior 
among auction participants. If the auction management suspects collusive behavior, the auctioneer will 
make up imaginary bids during the auction. 
13
 Filene’s Basement has an inventory control system that follows a modified Dutch auction strategy. 
Merchandise in the basement of the store is systematically discounted as time goes on.  
14
 Solomon Bothers was potentially offering questionable bids for Treasury bills during auctions in the 
early 1990s. In the past, the Treasury used a sealed bid auction, which is used when there are multiple units 
of the same product for sale. The sealed bids are sorted from highest to lowest and the T-bills are awarded 
accordingly, until all T-bills are matched with buyers. In this framework, there are different winning bid 
prices. 
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the auction block. Vickrey (1961) stated in his work that a “first rejected bid” has a higher 
probability of achieving a Pareto-optimal solution than what he termed the “last accepted bid” 
method. Again, bids are submitted in a sealed form such that the competitive bidders do not know 
the amount that the other bidders are offering. The unique feature is that the winner pays the 
second highest amount bid as the name suggests. But for this structure to work properly, the 
bidding levels must be done in secret, since it would be easily manipulated if everyone knows 
that the others are bidding since the second-highest amount wins.15 
 Auction structure is clearly an antitrust industrial organizational issue: pareto efficient 
structure should be one where it protects the marketplace from the destructive effects of 
conspiracy, predatory pricing behavior, and monopoly-type effects. Kempeter (2001) suggests 
various solutions to limit collusive behavior, especially in an ascending auction. He says that 
auction participants may find it helpful if the lots are bid in round numbers with specified 
increments, and bidders are able to remain somewhat anonymous. Moreover, the number of 
bidders should remain unknown for these types of auctions to remain healthy (Cramton and 
Schwartz, 2000 and Salant, 2000).  
 Klemperer (1998) introduced the Anglo-Dutch auction, where the auction process starts 
as a simple ascending auction until there are only a few bidders left. Then, the process moves into 
the First-price Sealed-bid arrangement where the bidders are required to bid at least as high as the 
last audible bid. 
 
                                               
15 Suppose a $5,000 violin is up for sale in a sparsely populated auction environment and someone bids 
$1,000. Another bidder could bid $10,000 and be guaranteed to get the violin for just  $1,000. 
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Hedonic Regressions 
 The core hedonic hypothesis is that each good is an aggregate of all individual 
characteristics (Brachinger, 2000). For a given good with K characteristics, let the vector of 
characteristics be such that 
X=(x1, … ,xK)  (2.3) 
 
The preferences of the economic agent are a function of the characteristics vector. Additionally,  
p = f(X) (2.4) 
 
 
describes the relationship between the market price and its attributes. Given the above equations, 
the implicit prices of the i-th characteristic are defined as the partial derivative,  
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Hedonic regressions come in various forms. The linear model is shown as 
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where the regression coefficient represents the marginal change of the price with respect to a k-th 
characteristic of the good.  Another functional form is the exponential form, and it is shown as  
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or, performing a natural log transformation,  
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where the implicit price is 
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and the coefficients are growth rates, since kβ  illustrates the marginal effects on the price 
function. 
 In what is termed as a power form (Brachinger, 2000), the following model is a double-
log function: 
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which is a transformation of 
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and the implicit price for any individual characteristic is given by 
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As is evident from this functional form, the regression coefficients are partial elasticities, since 
the coefficients show the percent change in price when the k-th characteristic, xk, has a unit 
percent change. 
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 A fourth, major approach found in the literature is the logarithmic function, 
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with hedonic prices as 
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The literature also includes the log-lin function, 
ln ∑
=
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ββ   (2.15) 
 
and the coefficients for the right hand side variables are approximately viewed as percentage 
effects on the dependent variable. 
 Given the various available forms, Freenstra (1995) finds that the linear model produces 
unbiased estimates. Freenstra models the auction environment as a perfectly competitive market 
with the auction sellers pricing their products at the marginal cost of production.16 This 
assumption, along with the traditional concave utility function, has the coefficients as the market 
value of the characteristics. This is especially helpful as the number of new characteristics is 
growing over time. For example, the option to include an iPod conection device in a vehicle did 
not exist in the last decade. More and more options are available for the consumer than were 
previously and this trend is continuing.  
 Rosen’s (1974) paper introduced the notion that the estimation of the marginal bid 
function could be found from supplier and demander interaction. Therefore, the hedonic price for 
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 In this case, the “firm” is the consignor of the vehicle at the auction block. He or she is usually seen 
standing right along side of the auctioneer during the bidding process. 
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a particular attribute is an estimate of both sides of the equation: the marginal offer from the seller 
and the marginal bid from the buyer.  
Hedonic studies have largely been motivated by two main concerns: first to identify 
implicit prices of various individual characteristics and second, to measure the welfare effects 
from the differing demand equations (Follain & Jimenez, 1985; Bresnahan & Gordon, 1997).  
Pakes (2004) says that Griliches (1961) revived Court’s (1939) perception that hedonics could 
correct the “new goods” problems in price indices. Since model characteristics change over time, 
price differentials, as measured by price indices, from one year to the next are not just due to 
overall price inflation. These price indices create the framework for hedonic modeling. This type 
of modeling can partially adjust for the “new characteristics” problem.   
In general, the hedonic function is an empirical summary of the relationship between 
prices and characteristics. Formally, it is the expectation on price, which is conditional on 
characteristics and measured by regressing prices on characteristics. The hedonic function 
summarizes the market’s marginal valuation for the different bundles of characteristics. 
Bartik (1987) shows that data must be taken from multiple markets to produce robust 
estimates for the hedonic demand parameters. He shows that if the demand parameters are 
estimated from single-market data, the results are not consistent. Specifically, he analyzes 
Mendelsohn (1985) and the instrument variable approach as in Palmquist (1984), Diamond and 
Smith (1985), and Ohsfeldt and Smith (1985).  
The approach in Mendelsohn (1985) may have inefficient hedonic results since there are 
unobserved tastes that alter the estimates to the demand parameters. Using only single market 
data requires the assumption that household tastes do not affect the marginal bidding price. In the 
instrumental variable approach, the author shows that the instrument may be correlated with the 
error term when there are unobserved shifts in tastes or preferences. Some might argue for 
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assuming away any unobserved tastes but, these “unobservables” are inevitably a factor in 
consumer behavior. Therefore, the better approach is to use data from multiple markets, as in 
Bartik (1987).17 
Brown and Rosen (1982) raise the identification issue in Rosen’s 1974 paper and attempt 
to address the influence of functional forms on hedonic prices. They assert that there comes a 
point where additional data do not add greater opportunities for a robust model. Mere quantity, in 
spite of quality, of data may not be that helpful in reaching for that robust model. Marginal prices 
that are constructed only from quantities do not in themselves add any information to that already 
provided by the general observation on levels of consumption alone. The best way to correct this 
problem, as suggested by the author, is to estimate marginal prices using data from distinctly 
different geographic markets. Brown and Rosen (1982) as well as Brown and Mendelson (1984) 
use spatially distinct markets to avoid the problem of making assumptions regarding consumer 
preferences, utility functions, and demand functions. As Palmquist (1984) notes, a benefit of 
using data from a number of different markets is that demand estimation need not be limited to a 
linear function. His particular model seeks to estimate the demand for different characteristics 
within the housing market. Since the number of square feet did not have a linear effect on price, 
this particular model included the square of total living area as an endogenous variable. 
Following the example of Brown and Rosen (1982), the data in this research are taken from 
spatially distinct auctions across the United States. 
                                               
17
 In this particular topic, multi-market data would be data from differing days at one particular auction or 
data from differing auction sites. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE AUTO AUCTION 
 
Since 1959, Atlanta-based Manheim Auctions has been the largest and highest volume 
auto auction in the world with over 120 auctions worldwide and over 30,000 employees.18 This 
subsidiary of Cox Enterprises, Inc. owns 86 auctions in North America and additional operations 
in France, Spain, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand. Because of their 
market dominance, the assumption is that Manheim’s policies and structure best replicate the 
industry standard (Table A.1). 
 
The Auction Environment 
Auto auctions are unusual. On one hand, there can be over five thousand vehicles sold in 
five hours or less; but on the other hand, only sixty percent of vehicles that come to the block are 
sold.19 The most common reason for this sales percentage is that the consignor has rejected the 
highest bid. If the seller rejects, he can participate in a later auction or he can attempt to sell the 
vehicle to someone who comes on the retail lot. Some have incorrectly stated that buyers at the 
auctions are not able to examine the vehicles before they are to start the bidding (Genesove, 1993, 
1995). However, the typical auction structure is such that the dealer can start the engine, inspect 
the body, and drive the vehicle around the auction property. Typically, the only restriction is the 
prohibition of taking the vehicle off site before a paid receipt is in hand. Although there are 
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 Total vehicles at all auctions in 2003 were 15 million. Of these, Manheim auctioned off approximately 
10 million in addition to the 1 million in online auctions. This accounts for 74% of the market. Manheim is 
also the largest non-factory painter of automobiles in the world according to Manheim Auctions, Inc. 
March 2004 Newsletter 
19
 The data collected by the author support this statement. 
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various, smaller auctions that are open to the public,20 the mainstream auto auctions are limited to 
dealers, whether wholesale or retail.21  
The experienced dealer follows a multi-step process before the auction begins. The major 
auction houses, Manheim Auto Auctions and Adesa Auctions, as well as some smaller auction 
houses such as the regional Carolina Auto Auction, distribute via electronic mail, the list of 
upcoming vehicles for the next auction. This list is sent only to registered dealers. This list is 
circulated at least one day before the auction and is continually updated until the final hard-copy 
version is printed and waiting for the dealers when they arrive the morning of the auction. In 
addition to details of options, year, and mileage, the vehicle identification number (VIN) is also 
included on this list. The VIN is available for those dealers interested in checking the history of a 
vehicle before the day’s activities begin.22 On auction days, each vehicle to be consigned is 
assigned a particular lane in the auction house and a specific “run” number so each attendee 
knows the lane location and order of each vehicle. To keep uniformity and continuity, lanes are 
dedicated to specific types of vehicles and specific consignors (Table A.2). As long as any 
auction employee is not busy with the vehicle, the potential bidder can test everything from the 
brakes to the wheel alignment both prior to and during the auction. 23 
The auction begins with vehicles in the lane farthest from the main auction house offices. 
Meanwhile, all the other lanes in operation are already filled with the vehicles queued. Thus, each 
                                               
20
 Penland’s Auction, in Greer, SC is open to non-dealers. However, this auction volume is 80% smaller 
than the typical Manheim auction and of poorer quality. 
21
 The differences between wholesale dealers and retail dealers are many. There are less sales quotas for the 
wholesaler as well as less insurance requirements, and less general regulations. At least in South Carolina, 
the regulations for the retailer cover everything from the required size of signage, size of office, type of 
building structure, lot size, type of lot surfacing, etc. Although the following is outside the scope of this 
paper, it would be interesting to examine the correlation of state dealer regulations with the relative level of 
state vehicle property taxes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are many “dealers” in South Carolina 
that are just trying to avoid the yearly property tax as well as the sales tax for every transaction incurred. 
22
 The popular databases are Autocheck and Carfax. 
23
 The large, Charlotte Adesa Auction has a small test track where interested parties can check the vehicle’s 
acceleration and braking abilities. The track consists of a straightaway with a length of 1/8 mi., or 220 
yards. 
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dealer who walks to the end must necessarily walk through the other lanes’ inventory. The 
auction house assigns the large volume consignors to start the day since these attract the large 
purchasers. When the time comes for the vehicle to arrive on the block, the one consigning the 
vehicle is typically requested to be up in the raised desk along with the auctioneer. However, 
there are times where the consignor is in absentia. In certain cases, a consignor may have 
multiple vehicles in multiple lanes; or, he may be bidding on a vehicle in another lane. 
At this point, the auctioneer has his assistants on the floor of the lane and is “working” 
the crowd and highlighting the bidding process. Before the bidding begins, the one who is selling 
the vehicle has written down an acceptable floor price on a sheet of paper that is in front of the 
auctioneer. While the bidding structure generally follows an English, or ascending bid auction, in 
reality, the auto auction utilizes a combination of both English and Dutch auction structures. The 
auctioneer starts out with a high price, typically higher than the minimum reserve, and then works 
his way down until he gets someone to start bidding. Then the auctioneer works the bidding price 
back up in ascending fashion.24  All of this takes place in just a few minutes. Eventually, the sale 
volume (as well as the noise volume) in the auction house increases as other auctioneers start the 
bidding in their respective lanes throughout the auction house.25 Most of the time, the vehicle is 
driven off and the next vehicle is in position before bidding has ended for the previous one.  
As mentioned, about one out of three vehicles fails to be consummated with a sale, so if 
the seller chooses, the vehicle can be re-run through the auction process that very same day.26 
                                               
24
 It is intriguing to point out that the auctioneers in Manheim’s flagship auction are compensated by salary. 
Further research should be pursued to examine the specific combination of pay structures. A cursory 
explanation might include the fact that these auctioneers are also involved in other aspects of the business, 
but personal observation suggests that only 15% of their time is off the block. 
25
 Most major auctions have eighteen lanes, but typically the first lane closest to the offices is reserved for 
the transportation companies and food concessions. Depending on the day of the week, as many at twelve 
lanes could be running, and on other days, as few as four lanes could be operating. 
26
 Unlike certain Ebay auctions, the seller’s reserve is not known at the car auction. However, if the reserve 
price were known, theory would suggest that if the car does not sell in its first run and if the consignor 
decides to re-run the vehicle, then the reserve will fall but perhaps not to the level of a sale on the re-run.  
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 After each lane has concluded all of its run numbers, the auction company regroups the 
unsold vehicles whose sellers desire another opportunity to make it to the auction block. The 
alternative to those sellers who did not find a buyer is taking the vehicle back to the auction house 
later or bringing the vehicle back to the lot, if available. If the seller wants to try his luck again, 
these regrouped vehicles are again brought to the block in the usual fashion but with two main 
differences: first, no other lanes are still in operation to compete for the potential buyer’s attention 
and second, all of these vehicles are reauctioned in the middle lane. It may be the case that the 
unsold vehicle was merely in the shadows of another auction so it is key that the re-auctioned 
group has no other simultaneous events to compete against it. 
For those who are consumers at the auction event, they find that all vehicles must be paid 
for on the day of sale.27 For those dealers who are purchasing more than the number of their 
available drivers, transportation companies are available. These transport services are allowed to 
rent a kiosk near the end of the lanes where they can advertise and negotiate.28  
Manheim offers a complete arbitration process, which is optional and only available on 
the day of the sale for some issues and extended to 7 days for other issues (Tables A.3 and A.4). 
The mere presence of these services suggests that quality is difficult to assess even though there 
are ample opportunities to drive and inspect the vehicle. The auction house announces a red light 
sale on those vehicles that are not arbitradable (Table A.5). 
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 https://www.manheim.com/members/auctions/policies.mpl?aid=AAA as of December 3, 2008. 
Approved methods of payment are cash, certified check, bank draft or an approved finance plan. 
28
 The economics of vertically integrating with the transport company is left for further research. There are 
other renters during the week, including those selling food concessions. The rental data should be readily 
available; however, this research does not examine the transportation segment of the auction nor the food 
concession segment. 
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Role of Auctions in Used Car Sales 
According to Manheim’s 2004 Used Car Market Report, the average franchised 
dealership had $32 million in revenues for 2003, and 29% of those revenues came from used car 
sales. As a result, dealers pay attention to their used vehicle inventory and use the auction 
environment to manage this inventory (Fig.3.1). 
 
Figure 3.1   Distribution of Vehicle Sales at a Typical Auction  
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Source: Manheim Used Car Market Report, 2003. 
Auctions are important to both the new and used vehicle markets, because they provide 
dealers with a quick source for inventory changes. Auctions also provide the administrative 
aspect by handling the title transfers and monies. Dealers attend auctions knowing that 
transactions are safe. If they discover a mechanical problem with a car before leaving the auction 
site, the sale can be nullified. Tables A.3 and A.4 list conditions for arbitration; therefore, these 
conditions act as a type of guarantee to quality. According to Manheim recommendations, a 
vehicle should not last more than forty-five to sixty days on a retail lot, so when it is time to 
change the inventory mix, dealers turn to the auctions (Fig A.1). 
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Figure 3.2   Total Vehicle Sales in Millions  
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Source: Manheim Used Car Market Report, 2004. 
 In 2003, Manheim reported that there were 43.6 million vehicles retailed, producing 
gross revenue of $366 billion (Fig.3.2). In addition, the stability of the used vehicle market is 
noteworthy. Only twice in the past fifteen years has used vehicle sales fluctuated by more than 
3% from one year to the next. According to CNW Marketing Research and R.L. Polk Company, 
the ratio of used vehicles to total operating vehicles has been stable at roughly 20% (Fig.3.3).  
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Figure 3.3   Total Used Vehicles Divided by Vehicles in Operation  
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Source: CNW Marketing Research and R.L. Polk Company. 
 The stability in used vehicle sales is driven by the large number of vehicles in operation. 
It is also driven by the increased durability and growing longevity of used vehicles (Fig.3.4). The 
used vehicles purchased in this decade will stay on the road longer than the used vehicles from 
previous decades. Generally, one out of every five vehicles in operation will undergo a change of 
ownership in a given year, and that percentage has remained largely steady for decades.29 
   
                                               
29
 This captures the number of times that the vehicle’s title has been retailed. That is, if one dealer sells to 
another dealer, that sale does not constitute a change of ownership. 
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Figure 3.4   Percentage of Model Year that Remain on Road by Age  
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Source: R.L. Polk Company. 
As vehicles increase in durability, they will remain longer on the roads. So as the number 
of used vehicle sales increases as well as vehicle-life expectancy, the place of the auction will 
become greater and greater as dealers will need this highly liquid environment for inventory 
management.  
The total number of operational vehicles increased from 201 million to 225 million from 
the six years proceeding July 1, 2003, and industry experts expect this growth to continue. A 
2003 Department of Transportation study shows that, for the first time ever, the average 
household had more than one car per driver.30 The growth in new unit sales, together with growth 
                                               
30
 U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics and Federal Highway 
Administration, 2001 National Household Travel Survey, Preliminary Data Release Version 1 (day trip 
data only), available at 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/transportation_statistics_annual_report/2003/excel/table_031_a.xls as of 
December 3, 2008. 
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in vehicle ownership and durability, all point toward strong growth in the remarketing and 
auction industry for the foreseeable future. 
Industry Segments 
In general, those who come to the auction find various types of sellers. Within the auction 
framework, a seller is categorized as a consignor-type. Of course, large retail dealers bring the 
most volume and variety in both make/model and in age, since most dealer-consigned vehicles 
are part of excess inventory.31 Fleet and Lease vehicles also make up a relatively large portion of 
the auction inventory. These vehicles are relatively stable segments, since these vehicles are 
typically remarketed after twenty-six months for a car and thirty months for a truck.32 These 
vehicles come to the market in great condition and with relatively low miles. Factory vehicles 
make up the smallest portion of the remarketing market. Most of these sales are limited to 
franchised dealers only; consequently, the auction house will not indiscriminately permit just any 
dealer to attend.  
Although the major auction houses are limited to licensed dealers, sprinkled across the 
county are auctions open to the general public.33 The sections immediately following do not apply 
to the public auctions, since the general auction participant is completely different from the dealer 
auctions. 
Rentals 
The major auto manufacturers offered powerful incentives to rental car companies to 
reallocate their fleets faster than in previous years. As a result, these types of vehicles were 
                                                                                                                                            
 
31
 On average, half of the vehicles in a used-car auction are from dealers, and the vast majority of these are 
trade-ins. 
32
 The industry uses the term, “remarketing” to describe the life-cycled process of a used car or truck. 
33
 There are many such auctions in the upstate of South Carolina where the public can participate. 
However, the selection is far from the quality of a dealer auction, and no arbitration policies exist. 
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remarketing at extremely high volumes and so auction prices were depressed across the board. 
The car rental industry, such as Enterprise and Budget, is one of the largest vehicle buyers in the 
country. According to industry reports, the rental industry bought 1.7 million new vehicles in the 
2003 model year, a 4.5% increase from the 2002 model year.34 Nearly 1.1 million of the sales 
consisted mostly of program (or rental repurchase) vehicles and the remaining were “risk” units.35 
Program vehicles are such that at the end of the contract period, the rental company simply 
returns the vehicle to the manufacturer, and then the manufacturer re-markets the vehicle. 
The car rental industry reports that they have two segment types: shorter-term daily rental 
and long-term insurance rentals. “Program vehicles” are those vehicles that the rental companies 
do not give back to manufacturers but actually decide to purchase under specific contracts with 
the automakers. The terms of the agreements often change each year to correspond to the 
changing needs of the auto and rental companies. In some years, the manufacturers must deal 
with excess capacity, so the willingness of the rental industry to absorb these vehicles creates a 
benefit for the automobile manufacturers. Industry specialists indicate that these vehicle supply 
contracts typically specify everything from the number of vehicles, the different models, the 
purchase and remarketing schedule, the restrictions on mileage, and a host of other details for the 
particular arrangement.  
The recycling time with the rental industry was reportedly small in 2003, so auto 
manufacturers shortened the cycle time incorporated into repurchase agreements. Large numbers 
of the rental repurchase vehicles sold that year were reportedly recycled much sooner than in 
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 The sources for these statistics are both the 2004 Manheim Used Car Market Report and the author’s 
conversations with dealers and auctioneers around the region. 
35
 Risk units are the vehicles that are directly purchased by the rental company and not given back at the 
end of the agreement. The rental firms are completely responsible for re-marketing these vehicles at the end 
of the cycle. 
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previous years. For example, the long term average of six to nine months and this year’s cycle 
was four to six months long. 
Risk cars are the vehicles that the rental company must remarket themselves instead of 
just turning back in to the manufacturer. That is, the rental company will take these vehicles to 
the auction and will have the responsibility to find buyers for these vehicles. Since some observe 
used car prices falling faster than expected,36 the rental companies are steering away from these 
arrangements and so have been cutting back on the amount of risk vehicles in their inventory. 
Therefore, some rental companies began operating their risk fleets longer. One way that these 
firms are reallocating inventory is by increasing the number of program vehicles and decreasing 
the number of risk vehicles in the fleet.  
The remarketing process is completely different for risk vehicles and program vehicles, 
since the sellers are different with different motivations. For example, program cars are, by 
definition, remarketed by the manufacturer, and so they are sold in a market open only to all of 
their dealers on an equal basis. A manufacturer is not the typical auto dealer since they have no 
retail lots to sell these vehicles. Therefore, these vehicles cars come to be sold through the auction 
houses.  
Risk cars, however, are remarketed in a variety of ways and many do not end up in the 
auction.37 The rental company uses various remarketing tools: it may send the vehicle to its own 
branded used car retail lot; they may send it directly to a local dealer; they also may decide to sell 
to a special fleet resale dealer. Dealers treat risk cars and program cars as different vehicles at the 
time of remarketing. Program vehicles typically have fewer miles because of the shorter cycling 
time as required by the manufacturer. The standard program vehicle should be newer, have lower 
mileage, may be in better condition, and is remarketed by the manufacturer. Given that 
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 2004 Manheim Used Car Market Report.  
37
 Manheim reports that only 43% of risk cars end up going through the traditional auction process.  
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manufacturers have a vested interest in brand image and price optimization, program vehicles are 
generally fully reconditioned in order to achieve the maximum wholesale price available. 
Although risk cars have historically received less reconditioning relative to other types of 
vehicles, a growing number of rental companies are beginning to use the full services of the body 
shop, which includes detail and paintless dent removal services before they run the vehicle at the 
auction.38 Since program vehicles are remarketed by the major manufacturers, these vehicles tend 
to be transported to other geographic locations and might be auctioned off in another state from 
where they were rented. In contrast, the risk vehicles do not have the special treatment and are 
typically sold locally and are rarely moved around to different geographic markets. 
Leasing 
New lease originations have continued to decline and the effects in the remarketing 
business are noticeable. In 2004 and beyond, this decline will lead to a substantial forecasted 
reduction in off-lease volumes. Today’s new leases have various types of agreement lengths and 
are more likely to be originated by an auto manufacturer’s internal finance company.39 Retail 
leasing of mainstream models in addition to luxury models, grew the fastest in the 1990s. Annual 
new lease originations first grew above one million in 1992 and by 1999, lease originations grew 
to more than 3.7 million.40 
The growth in leasing contracts was fueled by the desire of consumers to keep monthly 
payments low during a time when the cost of new vehicles were dramatically increasing while 
                                               
38
 Dent Wizard is a subsidiary of Cox Enterprises, the holding company of Manehim. Dent Wizard is the 
company that most firms use when they bring a vehicle to auction. These firms are the manufacturers, 
dealers, rental companies, and insurance companies. Each auction has a Dent Wizard facility at the auction 
complex. This is another example of horizontal integration with wholesale auto auctions. 
39
 A “captive finance arm” is the financing division for a particular automotive manufacturer, such as 
Mercedes-Benz Credit. 
40
 2004 Manheim Used Car Market Report. 
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real disposable income was barely holding up against these inflationary times.41 In an earlier 
attempt to address this problem, the auto industry had in the 1970s and 1980s, moved from 
shorter leases that had a three-year time frame and moved to longer-termed five-year leases. But 
now, by allowing customers to finance only the first part of the arrangement, the industry was 
able to depress to a greater degree the relationship between monthly payments and the sticker 
price. In the late 1990s however, new vehicle prices flattened and real disposable income began 
to rise. 
 The change in the economic landscape, as indicated by such variables as income growth 
and interest rate volatility, has changed the role of leasing for the auto industry. It is possible that 
the percentage of revenue from leasing is rising and now leasing may have moved from a loss 
leader to a main revenue-generating strategy. Some of the lease agreements may overestimate 
residual value and in that way, lessors have created an incentive for consumers to trade in the 
leased vehicle and move to another.42  
With residuals too high, lessees had less of an incentive to actually purchase the vehicle 
at the end of the lease and so the number of off-lease vehicles that finance firms supplied to the 
used car market increased. Banks and independent lessors would be negatively affected by the 
increased supply of these types of vehicles as auction-clearing prices would decline in this 
category. The captive finance arms of the manufacturers have slightly different cost structures so 
they continued to lease, but cut back on incentives and instead, focused their efforts on the leasing 
of luxury models. 
It is reported that new vehicle retail consumer leases totaled less than 1.7 million in 2003, 
a decline of 52% from the peak in the late 1990s.43 Three trends existed in the 2003 leasing 
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 BLS publishes personal income reports and Polk publishes leasing information. 
42
 Residual value is the value of the vehicle at the end of the leasing term. 
43
 Author’s conversation with auction managers 
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market: captive finance companies ended up with a large percentage of the market, leasing 
became more popular in the luxury car market, and leasing contracts were extended. 44  
 
Fleet 
The majority of fleet customers are commercial firms and government agencies and so 
this category remains a relatively stable industry segment. Although many fleet vehicles are sold 
to company individuals, those vehicles coming to auction remain desirable to sensitive buyers 
who are looking for vehicles that have been well maintained. According to recent reports, the 
number of non-rental fleet vehicles in operation has fallen in each of the past five years, but still 
remains above 10 million, which is a significant portion of the used vehicle market.45 The 
decrease in fleet vehicles is a result of companies cutting back on costs and diminishing the 
number of employee who would be eligible for these benefits. 
The fleet industry has very few companies but these few firms operate a large percentage 
of the total fleet units. Of all fleet vehicles, only about three million of these are for “small” 
fleets, which are those with only five to fourteen vehicles in operation. The various options of 
purchase, operation, and remarketing of these small fleets are quite similar to the purchase and 
sale of private-party vehicles, so the remaining discussion applies mostly to the rest of the 
vehicles operating in fleets of fifteen or more vehicles. 
Three categories commonly comprise the established fleet segment: commercial, 
government, and police/taxi. In early 2003, commercial fleets had 3.1 million vehicles in 
operation where the most popular fleet vehicles are domestic, such as Ford economy models, 
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 The top five independent leasing firms accounted for 55% of all non-captive leasing in 2003, up from 
35% in 2000. 
45
 Bobit Auto Group Research Department  
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Chevrolet base models, such as Impala and Malibu Classic, Pontiac economy models, and Dodge 
sedans. These domestic makes comprise 98% of the commercial fleets.  
The government segment consists of more than 3.4 million vehicles, or roughly 49% of 
the total nonrental fleets in service. The majority of government fleets are at the local and state 
levels. Governments usually own their fleets, which are typically large with little overall 
fluctuation and consistent vehicle recycle agreements. Although the police segment of the fleet 
industry could be considered as a subset of the government segment, police fleets are included 
with taxi fleets due to their similar characteristics of long life cycles and high mileage at the end 
of their use. There are no police or taxi fleet vehicles in this research, which is due to the fact that 
these vehicles rarely come through a standard dealer-only auction. 
Auto remarketers continually shift their buying and selling patterns to keep up with the 
constantly changing trends in used vehicle prices In an effort to minimize vehicle depreciation 
expense and maximize vehicle use, fleet managers have altered vehicle replacement schedules, 
encouraged employee sales, and changed driver eligibility requirements. 
The remarketing strategy for fleet vehicles varies according to the seller. Generally, in 
2003, the typical fleet vehicle sold at auction was two to five years old, had 80,000 miles, sold for 
approximately $6,000, and was in good mechanical condition. Commercial fleets remarket their 
vehicles in a variety of ways. Buyers can be anyone from the vehicle’s main driver, to other 
employees in the company, to fleet resale dealers, or dealers at auction. In recent years, fleet 
managers have made a concerted effort to increase sales to other employees in the company if the 
current main driver does not decide to purchase the vehicle. Most fleet management companies 
have established internet applications to help the ease at which vehicles can be remarketed. 
Today, approximately 30% of commercial fleet vehicles are sold within their organizations. 
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Although they utilize a wide array of remarketing outlets, commercial fleets still run a large 
number of units through the auction. 
By law, government fleets are generally required to sell their end-of-service vehicles at 
public sales. Sometimes the government agency will decide to remarket vehicles at large and 
specially noted sales events, where a wide array of government property is sold (e.g., lawn 
mowers, construction equipment, office furniture, etc.). Increasingly, however, many government 
officials have found that vehicles are best remarketed separately. Often they will utilize the 
services of public auctions. 
Remarketing of police vehicles and taxis is altogether different. Often police vehicles are 
remarketed to taxi companies, which then drive the vehicles to the end of their useful lives. The 
exception to this trend is the growing number of limousine and executive vehicles. Many of these 
vehicles are purchased new and then remarketed to economy limo or taxi services. 
Repossessions 
The number of repossessions hovers below one million, if the series follows trend.46 Ford 
Motor Credit has repossessed approximately 200,000 vehicles in each of the past two years. The 
initial push to 0% financing kept repossession rates very low, since borrowing costs were 
unusually low but there also likely was an increased number of high-quality credit customers who 
also wanted to take advantage of 0% financing. That trend, however, is now being more than 
offset by the lengthening of loan terms. Generally speaking, there is a disproportionate rise in 
delinquencies and repossessions for every increase in contract duration. The majority of banks, 
especially those involved in direct auto lending as opposed to indirect, cater to prime credit 
customers and thus their repossession rates are even lower. Here again, however, some increase 
                                               
46
 Bobit Auto Group (http://www.automotive-
fleet.com/Statistics/StatsViewer.aspx?file=http://www.automotive-fleet.com/fc_resources/stats/AFFB05-
k.pdf&channel=Remarketing  as of Dec 3, 2008) 
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can be expected in the years ahead due to the significant lengthening of terms. Subprime lenders 
by definition deal with those that have credit blemishes; thus, these specialty lenders must accept 
and be willing to deal with the higher level of repossessions. Exactly how high a repossession rate 
they should expect depends on how deep, or how far down on the credit scale, they are willing to 
finance. 
Buy-Here Pay-Here dealers, of course, interact with repossession risk on a daily basis. 
Some of their repossessions are simple where the driver simply brings back the car. In some 
respects, this is more like the return of a rental vehicle where the obligations cannot be met as 
opposed to what is normally considered a repossession. Some repossessions are not that simple, 
however, and some Buy-Here Pay-Here dealers are beginning to install inexpensive GPS tracking 
devices on vehicles at the time of sale of in order to make the recovery process easier.  
When a repossession occurs, virtually all of the lender’s recovery will be based on the 
value received when the vehicle is auctioned. As most of these types of dealers can attest, 
additional actions against defaulted borrower are rarely pursued but this risk is calculated during 
the initial transaction. It is not surprising, then, that auto dealers and financiers keep a close watch 
on prices of used vehicle price as they model various levels of business risk. This risk includes 
the estimation of residual value, depreciation rates, and loan-to-value calculations. 
Dealers 
Franchised, independent, and Buy-Here Pay-Here dealers all focus on successfully 
managing their inventory. The more successful dealers carefully monitor inventory turnover rates  
and seek out the most profitable remarketing channel for their unwanted inventory. Franchised 
and independent dealers retailed 29.9 million used units in 2003.47 Gross revenue for these sales 
exceeded $310 billion. And, of course, it is this rotation in retail demand that drives the 
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successful inventory management for retail dealers. Indeed, dealers are the main force in the 
overall automotive and auction industry.  
The retail auto dealer business is a diverse industry. These dealers make a profit when 
meeting consumer demand on a timely basis. This is where the auto auction services come to 
play. There are various types of dealer structure and major differences show up in structure, 
operations, financing ability, vehicle type and profit growth levels. 
Franchised dealers represent 37% of used car sales.48 In 2003, the majority of the auto 
dealerships sold 16.7 million new vehicles and retailed 16.2 million used ones. Gross revenues, 
including auto servicing, finance and insurance, increased by 4% to $700 billion. 
In 2003, “certified used vehicle sales” at franchised dealers reached almost 1.5 million 
cars, a significant gain over the year. Manufacturers have promoted these pre-certified vehicles to 
consumers with national advertising campaigns, special incentives, such as extended warranties. 
Their goal has been to increase consumer demand for this type of vehicle, thereby improving 
residual values while building brand recognition among used car consumers. “Certified used 
cars” are late-model units brought to dealers through various channels, including manufacturers 
that work directly with dealers, auto auctions, trade ins, and dealer purchase of lease returns. 
Independent dealers sold 200,000 vehicles in 2003, which was below its 2001 peak 
according to statistics reported by CNW Marketing Research. Even with a dip in sales, 
independent dealers purchased a record number of units last year. Typical reports suggest that 
there are approximately 54,000 independent dealers in the United States but this number has been 
declining slowly over time. But, of course, any count depends on the definition of “independent 
dealer,” and distinguishing between the differences among dealers, whether they are wholesale or 
retail, is nearly impossible. Many states do not make a distinction between these types of dealers, 
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so data are not available. Recognition of the differences within the independent dealer ranks is 
more important than knowing the actual number of independent dealers. Independents range from 
one person selling a few vehicles a year all the way up to CarMax, which employs 8,300 people 
and retailed 190,100 used vehicles in its fiscal year ending February 28, 2003.49 Furthermore, 
independent dealers range from those selling late-model, high-end luxury cars at an average price 
higher than the price of an economy class new car, to those selling used vehicles at an average 
price of less than $2,000. The overwhelming majority of independent dealerships have just one 
lot, but some are part of a chain of used car stores. Ironically, some are even franchised in that 
they sell under the umbrella of a rental car company or some other entity. In addition, some rental 
car companies, such as Enterprise, Hertz, Budget, and Thrifty, operate their own retail used car 
lots. 
No generally accepted statistics exist on the number of Buy-Here Pay-Here dealers in the 
United States, but the auction data suggest that this group had a great year in 2003. As some 
subprime lenders curtailed their loan originations in 2003, the only retail used vehicle market 
available to many credit-challenged customers was the Buy-Here Pay-Here lot. The potential 
customer base available to Buy-Here Pay-Here dealers is enormous and growing, but unless the 
dealer is very well financed and/or is willing to take the risk of putting ever larger amounts of 
personal money on the street, growth is restrained by that business reality.  
At franchised dealerships, the used vehicle department usually provides a better net 
return than the new vehicle department. The retail gross margin on a used car was 11.8% in 2003 
compared to 5.4% on a new car, according to NADA. What’s more, due to greater auction access 
and the presence of an active wholesale market, dealers are generally able to turn their used 
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vehicle inventory quicker than their new vehicle inventory (forty-five days versus sixty days). 
Thus, the return on investment for used vehicles is superior than for new vehicles.  
The following Table 3.1 summarizes the specific segments of those who supply vehicles 
to sell at auction. 
SELLER TYPE VEHICLES (MILLIONS)
RENTAL
Manufacturers Program Vehicles 1.1
Rental Companies 0.6
OFF-LEASE
Captive Finance Companies 2.3
Banks & Other Indep. Lessors 1.0
FLEET
Fleet Mgmt. Companies 0.5
Comm. & Gov't Fleet Owners 1.2
REPOSSESSIONS
Captive Finance Companies 0.5
Banks, Credit Unions & Other Finance Companies 0.3
Subprime Lenders 0.4
Buy-Here Pay-Here Dealers 0.3
DEALERS 14.7
TOTAL 22.9
Source: Manheim Auto Auctions
Table 3.1 Types of Vehicles Remarketed (2003)
 
 
Recent Trends 
Over the past few months, Manheim Auto Auctions have incorporated the new Simulcast 
system in the auction process. This is an internet-based process where the registered dealer, who 
may be unable to attend a physical auction, still has the ability of buying new inventory or selling 
old inventory. Simulcast allows the dealer to see live video from the auction lane as well as audio 
and text. Each bid is entered onto the screen as well as the attributes of the vehicle, including the 
identification of the consignor. For those in the physical auction lane, Manheim has installed 
large screens, which alert the auctioneer of the virtual participant. Manheim began offering its 
new Simulcast feature in 300 lanes at 70 different auctions at the end of 2003 with plans for 
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greater development in other auction houses. In the first year, it has been reported that Manheim 
sold almost 1 million vehicles over Simulcast and expectations are high for future growth with 
Simulcast.50 The technological progress with the auction process has allowed Manheim to also 
provide Cinema-style sales, where bidders are able to sit in a theatre-type room and bid based on 
digital photographs.51 Similar to Simulcast, the prospective buyer is able to view still pictures and 
condition reports without having to physically walk to the vehicle of interest. 
 Trends to merge various methods of remarketing have grown stronger in the last year. 
For example, an auction company owns the online services of autotrader.com, which gives 
opportunities to sell outside the auction environment and sell to the general public. Also, 
Manheim’s Dealer Exchange is another variation on the auction theme. Here, the bidding works 
like Ebay: the consignor is able to keep his inventory in his lot rather than incurring the expense 
and hassle of taking the vehicle to the physical auction. In the Dealer Exchange, the seller has an 
opportunity to spread the bidding on a vehicle over a number of days or a number of hours. Those 
on the demand side will be able to bid from any location via the internet. As with Simulcast, 
pictures and descriptions of the vehicle appear on the website. Dealer Exchange is advertised as 
the “largest dealer-to-dealer marketplace.” Manheim is able to act as an mediator if needed and 
generates fees from this service. 
 As the structure of the marketplace continues to evolve, various geographic locations 
have increased the level of technology integration as these auction houses plan for the future.  
Auction companies are now producing dealer-tailored software that works with dealer needs such 
as inventory management, updates into Quickbooks, syncs with Autotrader and Dealer Exchange, 
downloads from auctions sale lists, and creates special dealer-specific reports. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE HEDONIC MODEL 
 This chapter contains three sections. First, a section is devoted to the data set and the 
various forms and descriptions within the total collection. The observations are analyzed at 
various levels of detail. The second section is the presentation of the models. Finally, tables of 
results and explanations of the results are given in the empirical results section of this chapter. 
The Data Set 
 Observations were taken over the course of just under two weeks at various Manheim 
Auto Auctions. Listed on the following pages is Table 4.1 showing the number of vehicles sold 
by seller category and vehicle manufacturer. The vehicle sample was taken from all major 
categories of consignors: Banking/Finance companies, Fleet/Lease companies, Dealer sales, and 
Other. Some within the automotive remarketing industry have even more specific categorization 
of consignors than just these four. However, many of these subcategories are included in other 
similar groupings. For example, the Factory Sales category is included in the Dealer category 
since Factory vehicles are typically auctioned off only to franchised dealers. This is confirmed by 
the data and in industry reports. These are the vehicles that will go to dealer lots and be marketed 
as pre-owned or pre-certified vehicles.  
The Banking/Finance category includes vehicles sold by banks and lending institutions, 
which also includes auto manufacturers’ financing  arms. These financing arms are also known as 
captive finance companies since they are limited in scope. Ford Motor Credit Company is an 
example of such an institution. Most manufacturers have now built up an internal captive finance 
company. Even Kia has their own Kia Motors Finance Company. The Banking/Finance category 
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also includes vehicles that have been repossessed; however, the level of repossessions is low 
since banks historically have catered to prime borrowers which have a low rate of default.  
Fleet/Lease vehicles are a large percentage of total auction activity as these vehicles have 
just come off of a lease, or a company fleet contract, or a part of a rental company’s special fleet. 
These vehicles are driven by someone other than the direct title-holder of the vehicle.  
Dealer sales vehicles are also a large portion of the auction. These are mostly trade-in 
vehicles which the established dealer is not interested in keeping on his particular lot. As shown 
in Table 4.1, the percentage of vehicles sold by seller type is categorized for analysis. For 
example, over eight thousand Chevrolet vehicles are included in the data set and forty six percent 
of these were sold by Dealers. The last category of seller type is Other. This category includes 
licensed individual wholesalers and smaller dealers who do not have the sales volume to be 
included in the Dealer category. These sellers usually come to auction with just one or two 
vehicles at a time. 
These categories of consignors are important for the auction bidder. This information is 
included in the general hedonic models since it should be a function of the overall selling price of 
the vehicle. In other words, the market-clearing price should also be dependent on seller type. The 
data set is presented and organized by make and model. 
For each day of buying and selling activity, the auction house publishes a pre-sale list 
giving perspective buyers information on the coming auction. Afterward, a post-sale list is 
compiled by the auction house so dealers may have a record of the selling prices from the recent 
buying activity. The post sale list is the source for the modeling in this research piece. The lists 
include the place and date of the auction, lane number assigned to the vehicle, order number 
within the lane, consignor, year, make, model, style, engine size, number of cylinders, number of 
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doors, four-wheel drive if applicable, cab size if applicable, fuel type, color, and mileage. The 
post-sale list also contains the winning bid for the vehicles sold.  
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Table 4.1 Number of Vehicles Sold by Seller Type
Make Total Bank/Finance Fleet/Lease Dealer Other
Acura 736                    275                    13                      265                    183                    
Audi 519                    317                    3                        142                    57                      
BMW 1,138                 467                    6                        529                    136                    
Buick 948                    102                    66                      550                    230                    
Cadillac 828                    122                    25                      532                    149                    
Chevrolet 8,274                 1,535                 472                    3,831                 2,436                 
Chrysler 1,410                 214                    70                      635                    491                    
Daewoo 119                    17                      6                        37                      59                      
Dodge 6,018                 1,058                 634                    2,184                 2,142                 
Eagle 62                      1                        3                        55                      3                        
Ford 15,645               4,158                 1,060                 5,268                 5,159                 
Geo 426                    107                    6                        197                    116                    
GMC 1,489                 307                    54                      755                    373                    
Honda 2,320                 356                    59                      1,160                 745                    
Hummer 42                      3                        -                     33                      6                        
Hyundai 766                    46                      220                    175                    325                    
Infinity 456                    30                      90                      143                    193                    
Isuzu 492                    36                      19                      218                    219                    
Jaguar 605                    52                      6                        262                    285                    
Jeep 2,364                 697                    68                      879                    720                    
Kia 623                    100                    59                      198                    266                    
LandRover 415                    130                    2                        163                    120                    
Lexus 992                    279                    20                      347                    346                    
Lincoln 1,547                 569                    58                      427                    493                    
Mazda 1,410                 144                    120                    490                    656                    
Mercedes 1,533                 675                    14                      627                    217                    
Mercury 2,084                 598                    185                    636                    665                    
Mitsubishi 2,057                 67                      833                    606                    551                    
Nissan 2,896                 147                    618                    1,006                 1,125                 
Oldsmobile 362                    69                      34                      170                    89                      
Plymouth 727                    141                    25                      403                    158                    
Pontiac 2,573                 568                    168                    1,163                 674                    
Porsche 241                    20                      4                        120                    97                      
Saab 381                    3                        2                        42                      334                    
Saturn 906                    249                    23                      387                    247                    
Subaru 575                    48                      12                      162                    353                    
Suzuki 396                    58                      10                      78                      250                    
Toyota 3,739                 197                    352                    1,440                 1,750                 
Volkswagen 1,232                 648                    23                      418                    143                    
Volvo 712                    19                      19                      143                    531                    
TOTAL 70,058               14,629               5,461                 26,876               23,092               
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The next table illustrates the summary details of the sample. Below are listed the mean, 
standard deviation and minimum and maximum levels for the given variable. For example, there 
were 29,248 sedans in the dataset. These sedans ranged from a brand new car with virtually no 
mileage to a forty year old car and over 200,000 miles on it. The category with the largest average 
miles as well as the largest standard deviation of mileage is the Van category. One might surmise 
that the Van categories is the most likely choice for a courier service.  
The data was broken down into make and model as shown below in Table 4.2. This table 
presents the number of vehicle observations selected from the broad data. Each model of vehicle 
has the number included in this sample, the mean, minimum and maximum prices, the range in 
years, mileage statistics, and other characteristics.  
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ALL COUPES
Variable # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DATE 8,190                 6/13 3.456 6/10 6/18
YR 8,190                 1998 3.642 1964 2003
DOORS 8,190                 2.000 0.022 2 4
ENG 8,190                 5.355 1.430 3 12
MILEAGE 8,190                 59,312 40,690 2 282,015
PRICE 8,190                 $10,610 $11,387 $100 $129,000
ALL PICKUPS
DATE 9,805                 6/13 3.371 6/10 6/18
YR 9,805                 1999 2.868 1976 2003
DOORS 9,805                 2.542 0.889 2 4
ENG 9,805                 6.823 1.423 4 10
MILEAGE 9,805                 64,130 41,335 65 288,601
PRICE 9,805                 $10,242 $5,721 $150 $35,500
ALL SEDANS
DATE 29,248               6/13 3.422 6/10 6/18
YR 29,248               1999 3.042 1962 2003
DOORS 29,248               3.999 0.050 2 4
ENG 29,248               5.294 1.336 3 12
MILEAGE 29,248               53,884 38,502 43 297,933
PRICE 29,248               $8,972 $7,075 $100 $79,500
ALL SUVS
DATE 15,938               6/13 3.396 6/10 6/18
YR 15,938               1999 2.473 1974 2003
DOORS 15,938               3.824 0.567 2 4
ENG 15,938               6.588 1.230 4 10
MILEAGE 15,938               56,440 35,156 105 286,436
PRICE 15,938               $12,806 $7,261 $100 $63,000
ALL VANS
DATE 6,058                 6/13 3.337 6/10 6/18
YR 6,058                 1999 2.847 1978 2003
DOORS 6,058                 3.998 0.057 2 4
ENG 6,058                 6.179 0.811 3 10
MILEAGE 6,058                 70,159 42,558 120 276,616
PRICE 6,058                 $7,473 $4,678 $100 $35,300
ALL WAGONS
DATE 819                    6/14 3.521 6/10 6/18
YR 819                    1999 3.395 1983 2003
DOORS 819                    3.993 0.121 2 4
ENG 819                    5.160 0.996 4 10
MILEAGE 819                    59,478 42,225 104 279,906
PRICE 819                    $9,880 $8,434 $150 $51,000
Table 4.2 Summary Statistics By Body Type
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BANK SELLER
Variable # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DATE 945                         6/13 2.985 6/10 6/18
YR 945                         1999 1.636 1989 2003
DOORS 945                         3.537 0.844 2 4
ENG 945                         6.078 1.494 4 10
MILEAGE 945                         58,319 29,413 931 224,388
PRICE 945                         $10,008 $6,086 $175 $48,250
DEALER SELLER
DATE 26,876                    6/13 3.387 6/10 6/18
YR 26,876                    1998 3.630 1962 2003
DOORS 26,876                    3.421 0.907 2 4
ENG 26,876                    5.993 1.492 3 12
MILEAGE 26,876                    75,310 44,010 2 297,933
PRICE 26,876                    $8,699 $8,614 $100 $129,000
FACTORY SELLER
DATE 1,839                      6/13 2.945 6/10 6/18
YR 1,839                      2002 1.364 1994 2003
DOORS 1,839                      3.682 0.731 2 4
ENG 1,839                      5.472 1.320 3 10
MILEAGE 1,839                      28,151 23,846 955 198,363
PRICE 1,839                      $11,246 $5,050 $400 $37,000
FINANCE SELLER
DATE 13,684                    6/14 3.384 6/10 6/18
YR 13,684                    2000 1.456 1974 2003
DOORS 13,684                    3.513 0.859 2 4
ENG 13,684                    6.048 1.414 4 12
MILEAGE 13,684                    44,940 25,645 105 242,190
PRICE 13,684                    $12,174 $7,444 $100 $107,500
LEASE SELLER
DATE 2,045                      6/14 3.119 6/10 6/18
YR 2,045                      2000 2.173 1964 2003
DOORS 2,045                      3.639 0.769 2 4
ENG 2,045                      5.809 1.366 4 10
MILEAGE 2,045                      57,181 33,032 326 239,869
PRICE 2,045                      $9,258 $5,640 $100 $45,000
OTHER SELLER
DATE 23,092                    6/13 3.482 6/10 6/18
YR 23,092                    2000 2.272 1972 2003
DOORS 23,092                    3.595 0.804 2 4
ENG 23,092                    5.754 1.419 3 12
MILEAGE 23,092                    50,318 34,315 43 288,601
PRICE 23,092                    $10,421 $6,689 $100 $88,500
RENTAL SELLER
DATE 1,577                      6/12 3.044 6/10 6/18
YR 1,577                      2002 0.897 1990 2003
DOORS 1,577                      3.877 0.481 2 4
ENG 1,577                      4.992 1.172 4 8
MILEAGE 1,577                      24,798 9,497 119 115,889
PRICE 1,577                      $10,855 $3,925 $1,000 $33,000
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics By Seller Type
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Broad Sample
Variable # of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DATE 70,058       6/13 3.408 6/10 6/18
YR 70,058       1999 2.993 1962 2003
DOORS 70,058       4 0.853 2 4
ENG 70,058       6 1.452 3 12
MILEAGE 70,058       58,007 39,191 2 297,933
PRICE 70,058       $10,095 $7,627 $100 $129,000
Table 4.4 Summary Statistics For Broad Sample
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Make Model
No. of 
Obs. MIN MAX MEAN Std. Dev. MIN MAX MEAN Std. Dev. MIN MAX MEAN Std. Dev.
ACURA CL 79 1997 2003 2000 1.659 4,200$     23,200$      12,944$   4,770$     5,656     119,864   52,872     26,300    
ACURA INTEGRA 164 1987 2001 1998 3.305 450$        18,500$      8,013$     3,976$     12,796   268,401   68,860     48,761    
ACURA LEGEND 55 1987 1999 1992 2.052 200$        9,600$        3,607$     2,130$     49,940   239,084   131,872   38,417    
ACURA OTHER 48 1992 2003 2000 2.987 500$        65,000$      22,078$   12,177$   7,393     204,983   43,998     37,999    
ACURA RL 122 1996 2002 2000 1.076 6,500$     29,500$      18,353$   4,296$     4,693     147,828   48,999     22,413    
ACURA TL 268 1996 2003 2000 1.166 2,500$     27,200$      15,429$   3,447$     4,175     147,119   45,355     21,065    
AUDI ASERIES 439 1996 2003 2000 1.238 4,800$     47,500$      17,765$   5,915$     1,305     122,786   42,440     20,326    
AUDI OTHER 22 1984 1998 1992 3.270 500$        13,600$      3,302$     3,747$     42,994   164,799   102,856   34,820    
AUDI SCLASS 16 2000 2003 2001 1.088 17,500$   55,700$      27,400$   10,903$   1,433     64,949     35,104     19,884    
AUDI TT 42 2000 2002 2001 0.790 15,750$   33,000$      23,290$   4,635$     2,608     56,738     25,981     14,641    
BMW 3SERIES 447 1983 2003 1999 3.498 300$        42,000$      18,934$   8,604$     1,262     252,800   51,199     39,751    
BMW 5SERIES 249 1984 2003 1998 3.112 500$        41,000$      19,601$   8,624$     5,173     188,794   59,399     34,399    
BMW 7SERIES 181 1986 2003 1999 3.294 600$        66,000$      29,916$   16,247$   2,153     237,753   55,223     39,560    
BMW MSERIES 53 1995 2003 2000 1.992 10,300$   62,200$      32,140$   13,883$   1,585     96,743     35,096     25,187    
BMW XSERIES 123 2000 2003 2001 0.633 12,300$   52,400$      32,473$   4,761$     1,973     84,458     38,843     15,257    
BMW ZSERIES 85 1997 2003 2000 1.488 12,000$   101,000$    21,572$   12,907$   823        78,110     32,615     18,759    
BUICK CENTURY 269 1987 2003 2000 3.490 175$        14,750$      6,455$     3,548$     5,626     196,095   51,416     35,578    
BUICK LESABRE 245 1984 2003 1998 3.685 225$        17,800$      6,161$     4,502$     9,445     226,056   74,208     42,002    
BUICK OTHER 49 1983 2002 1996 4.312 400$        22,500$      6,717$     5,961$     12,790   211,505   77,661     46,011    
BUICK PARKAVE 122 1986 2003 1997 3.904 200$        20,500$      7,529$     5,877$     12,560   213,486   75,623     47,019    
BUICK REGAL 195 1984 2003 1998 3.857 225$        14,100$      5,716$     3,843$     1,473     188,768   71,105     42,594    
BUICK ROADMASTER 26 1991 2002 1994 2.240 900$        16,400$      3,634$     2,847$     27,177   147,562   96,377     32,515    
BUICK SKYLARK 42 1990 1998 1995 2.308 150$        3,900$        1,448$     1,132$     29,362   171,457   102,803   34,931    
CADILLAC CATERA 61 1997 2001 1998 1.206 2,700$     13,700$      7,861$     2,989$     12,873   125,642   53,742     27,473    
CADILLAC DEVILLE 389 1973 2003 1997 3.979 200$        29,100$      9,398$     8,087$     5,845     205,670   78,828     38,035    
CADILLAC ELDORADO 62 1982 2002 1996 4.592 150$        36,500$      9,866$     8,220$     6,690     223,199   74,445     41,250    
CADILLAC ESCALADE 120 1999 2003 2001 1.288 9,900$     47,000$      27,228$   8,816$     3,436     137,445   43,497     20,807    
CADILLAC OTHER 40 1976 2003 1994 6.419 220$        31,200$      9,554$     10,676$   1,346     213,821   84,185     56,805    
CADILLAC SEVILLE 156 1984 2003 1998 3.009 850$        28,900$      11,587$   7,034$     8,298     169,127   66,185     36,810    
CHEVY 1500 1792 1987 2003 1999 2.888 400$        35,500$      11,358$   5,475$     413        288,601   74,109     45,544    
CHEVY ASTRO 380 1986 2003 1998 3.188 125$        15,500$      5,619$     3,563$     5,493     276,616   87,655     47,861    
CHEVY AVALANCHE 57 1997 2003 2002 1.139 7,500$     26,400$      21,018$   4,128$     6,439     106,628   32,783     23,534    
CHEVY BERETTA 28 1989 1996 1993 2.490 175$        3,000$        1,188$     810$        65,771   173,597   114,309   30,128    
CHEVY BLAZER 862 1982 2003 1998 3.076 200$        15,700$      6,992$     3,552$     3,259     286,436   72,847     42,272    
CHEVY CAMARO 291 1969 2002 1997 4.598 300$        23,200$      7,306$     4,838$     1,224     206,598   71,193     42,647    
CHEVY CAVALIER 834 1988 2003 2000 2.756 150$        10,700$      4,307$     2,282$     197        208,603   54,504     36,108    
CHEVY CORSICA 49 1988 1996 1995 1.695 100$        3,900$        1,146$     852$        29,866   204,681   100,907   35,622    
CHEVY CORVETTE 169 1964 2003 1997 6.501 2,800$     44,750$      22,743$   10,583$   216        178,930   49,063     35,634    
CHEVY GSERIES 188 1984 2003 1997 4.140 275$        35,300$      6,655$     5,260$     7,458     242,414   85,512     47,490    
CHEVY IMPALA 289 1962 2003 2001 2.542 4,200$     17,300$      9,060$     2,581$     1,532     133,407   47,020     23,419    
CHEVY LUMINA 265 1990 2001 1996 2.559 150$        7,700$        2,345$     1,544$     28,886   279,906   102,521   39,775    
CHEVY MALIBU 651 1981 2003 2000 1.764 400$        13,800$      6,124$     2,409$     114        194,095   49,722     29,405    
CHEVY MONTECARLO 248 1978 2003 1999 2.545 700$        19,600$      8,248$     4,337$     4,631     181,034   56,731     33,129    
CHEVY OTHER 96 1968 2001 1995 6.177 200$        14,300$      5,455$     3,696$     7,958     228,858   86,151     44,341    
CHEVY S10 665 1983 2003 1999 2.932 250$        16,600$      6,177$     3,512$     296        207,295   60,087     39,486    
CHEVY SILVERADO 24 1999 2002 2000 0.974 4,800$     25,600$      13,215$   5,049$     10,713   177,667   73,145     37,895    
CHEVY SUBURBAN 572 1981 2003 1999 2.841 350$        34,500$      15,017$   7,291$     2,572     264,272   75,225     42,574    
CHEVY TAHOE 578 1995 2003 2000 1.834 1,200$     32,000$      15,775$   6,559$     5,055     172,756   65,156     33,384    
CHEVY TRAILBLAZER 100 2002 2003 2002 0.496 900$        24,100$      19,272$   2,794$     977        78,586     23,563     11,503    
CHEVY VENTURE 263 1997 2003 2000 1.678 1,700$     17,000$      7,876$     3,659$     5,640     193,630   60,819     30,349    
Year Price Mileage
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CHRYSLER 300M 158 1999 2003 2000 0.737 2,000$     21,600$      11,960$   3,133$     2,333     96,605     48,893     20,730    
CHRYSLER CIRRUS 82 1995 2000 1998 2.031 1,000$     9,400$        3,874$     2,084$     17,672   153,652   73,180     30,260    
CHRYSLER CONCORDE 222 1993 2003 1999 2.232 400$        15,900$      6,193$     3,259$     457        172,953   63,616     33,186    
CHRYSLER LEBARON 38 1987 1995 1992 2.264 100$        4,100$        1,161$     999$        33,572   149,062   98,242     29,141    
CHRYSLER LHS 82 1994 2001 1998 2.346 500$        13,900$      5,984$     4,056$     22,028   160,786   79,412     33,226    
CHRYSLER OTHER 86 1986 2003 1996 4.920 150$        35,100$      5,204$     6,607$     1,629     175,484   75,082     43,760    
CHRYSLER PTCRUISER 122 2001 2003 2002 0.728 6,000$     15,000$      11,016$   1,568$     115        93,659     26,454     15,657    
CHRYSLER SEBRING 346 1995 2003 2000 2.010 425$        18,500$      8,852$     4,021$     43          170,936   49,312     32,452    
CHRYSLER TWN&CNTRY 274 1992 2003 1999 2.191 900$        27,600$      9,030$     4,721$     2,812     204,156   66,495     35,897    
DAEWOO LANOS 21 1999 2002 2000 0.870 400$        5,100$        2,119$     1,342$     10,067   84,674     40,296     21,363    
DAEWOO LEGANZA 46 1999 2002 2000 0.822 500$        6,200$        3,218$     1,686$     10,024   84,678     38,622     19,857    
DAEWOO NUBIRA 52 1999 2002 2001 0.658 500$        5,500$        3,143$     1,209$     7,687     97,326     35,199     18,133    
DODGE AVENGER 65 1995 2000 1997 1.368 500$        7,500$        3,517$     1,906$     24,967   169,955   84,988     31,935    
DODGE CARAVAN 450 1989 2003 1998 2.786 200$        16,200$      4,983$     3,295$     3,162     222,812   79,064     41,087    
DODGE DAKOTA 413 1988 2003 1999 2.658 200$        20,200$      8,173$     4,459$     2,825     239,795   63,971     37,499    
DODGE DURANGO 755 1998 2003 2000 0.995 2,700$     24,800$      12,369$   2,959$     869        142,521   50,958     22,509    
DODGE GCARAVAN 668 1990 2003 2000 2.753 400$        18,400$      9,085$     4,884$     2,496     185,056   58,810     39,776    
DODGE INTREPID 719 1993 2003 2001 2.427 175$        12,800$      7,155$     3,442$     1,682     163,746   50,950     35,313    
DODGE NEON 727 1995 2003 2001 2.454 300$        12,300$      4,928$     2,666$     655        175,278   44,620     34,806    
DODGE OTHER 68 1978 2003 1993 4.083 100$        84,500$      6,356$     15,715$   13          179,576   93,598     43,363    
DODGE RAM 1477 1985 2003 1999 2.418 310$        29,800$      10,709$   5,504$     2,166     244,920   67,494     39,968    
DODGE STRATUS 676 1995 2003 2001 2.070 500$        15,200$      6,689$     2,915$     105        172,389   42,874     30,632    
EAGLE OTHER 62 1989 1998 1996 2.168 200$        4,100$        2,443$     1,258$     32,987   195,426   91,058     36,457    
FORD AEROSTAR 74 1989 1997 1995 2.049 100$        4,400$        1,456$     1,092$     19,287   209,270   111,531   37,355    
FORD BRONCO 67 1981 1996 1991 3.666 175$        8,400$        2,478$     2,034$     10,443   188,609   84,597     45,026    
FORD CONTOUR 304 1995 2000 1998 1.479 200$        9,500$        2,680$     1,536$     5,976     188,515   76,005     30,908    
FORD CROWNVIC 181 1984 2003 1997 4.030 100$        18,000$      5,554$     4,287$     1,581     198,052   73,921     40,638    
FORD E150 248 1978 2003 1998 3.531 350$        22,000$      7,146$     4,362$     6,663     242,148   78,316     45,470    
FORD E250 145 1988 2003 1998 2.855 325$        17,200$      5,954$     3,934$     4,257     271,123   103,281   61,055    
FORD E350 176 1992 2002 2000 2.619 450$        26,000$      10,824$   4,954$     4,894     239,756   68,043     51,848    
FORD ESCAPE 246 1998 2003 2002 0.707 1,350$     19,300$      14,223$   2,519$     2,927     117,590   29,217     15,319    
FORD ESCORT 591 1988 2002 1999 2.796 100$        11,200$      3,211$     2,090$     2,882     256,127   61,699     37,806    
FORD EXCUR 132 2000 2003 2001 0.973 2,500$     37,500$      18,158$   4,756$     2,273     123,937   47,591     22,661    
FORD EXPED 1129 1996 2003 2000 1.480 2,700$     31,900$      14,709$   4,490$     466        213,527   59,512     30,238    
FORD EXPLOR 2526 1991 2003 1999 2.601 200$        23,300$      10,036$   5,049$     1,059     219,329   55,547     33,225    
FORD F150 2156 1981 2003 1999 2.769 250$        28,700$      11,390$   5,516$     1,676     252,736   59,091     37,245    
FORD F250 382 1976 2003 1999 3.555 500$        33,100$      13,795$   7,760$     2,569     251,575   81,086     47,971    
FORD F350 216 1985 2003 1999 3.070 675$        34,200$      17,697$   8,439$     3,542     218,936   76,852     47,008    
FORD F500 18 1988 2002 1996 4.824 2,000$     35,000$      14,072$   8,418$     14,996   203,073   76,132     52,689    
FORD FOCUS 835 2000 2003 2001 0.895 700$        12,800$      5,942$     1,679$     303        176,176   37,332     21,504    
FORD MUSTANG 955 1969 2003 1999 3.032 400$        28,600$      9,445$     4,277$     474        203,949   46,298     32,066    
FORD OTHER 29 1985 1997 1993 2.939 100$        1,725$        580$        324$        7,752     175,923   84,790     31,855    
FORD PROBE 49 1989 1997 1994 2.096 150$        3,900$        1,108$     794$        65,316   184,770   117,581   32,445    
FORD RANGER 1524 1984 2003 2000 2.319 325$        19,500$      7,688$     3,480$     1,062     206,404   48,458     31,676    
FORD TAURUS 2055 1988 2003 2000 2.480 125$        13,500$      6,569$     3,194$     326        200,128   46,391     34,441    
FORD TBIRD 121 1979 2002 1995 3.828 200$        25,500$      4,618$     7,663$     125        184,119   92,365     44,633    
FORD WINDSTAR 1486 1995 2003 2000 1.855 500$        23,500$      8,259$     4,140$     2,824     203,994   54,541     32,976    
GEO METRO 73 1990 2001 1997 3.279 100$        4,000$        1,779$     1,197$     24,502   230,438   72,715     36,698    
GEO PRIZM 169 1990 2002 1999 2.826 150$        8,600$        3,991$     2,030$     6,575     240,571   61,021     39,060    
GEO TRACKER 184 1989 2003 1999 2.701 550$        13,300$      5,726$     3,009$     4,421     199,829   52,273     32,267    
GMC 207 1985 2003 1998 3.376 700$        27,600$      11,172$   6,179$     1,772     235,962   80,681     48,436    
GMC 1500 239 1984 2003 1999 2.598 450$        25,600$      10,867$   4,840$     5,845     212,499   71,057     42,289    
GMC 2500 31 1991 2002 1999 2.695 2,350$     30,100$      12,547$   6,771$     11,921   176,886   73,936     41,454    
GMC 3500 6 1993 2001 1998 3.347 5,650$     25,200$      14,975$   8,616$     33,860   151,348   79,902     44,728    
GMC ENVOY 25 2002 2003 2002 0.332 14,100$   26,000$      21,434$   3,107$     3,661     92,130     27,043     18,536    
GMC GSERIES 33 1988 2002 1999 2.772 1,500$     25,000$      10,467$   5,461$     11,906   160,847   61,048     31,232    
GMC JIMMY 266 1984 2001 1998 2.982 150$        15,000$      7,017$     3,386$     13,289   250,992   72,556     38,928    
GMC OTHER 6 1996 2003 2000 2.483 7,300$     16,400$      12,483$   3,530$     15,242   104,177   54,501     34,887    
GMC RALLYWAGON 27 1986 2002 1994 4.267 400$        14,900$      4,249$     3,810$     9,763     146,180   92,616     40,853    
GMC SAFARI 80 1987 2002 1997 3.265 450$        14,800$      4,667$     3,419$     6,586     208,706   101,378   47,175    
GMC SIERRA 30 1993 2003 1999 2.459 2,900$     20,200$      12,185$   4,774$     6,606     177,130   69,404     42,145    
GMC SONOMA 154 1991 2003 1999 2.466 250$        16,000$      6,086$     3,220$     4,273     187,105   63,377     35,192    
GMC SUBURBAN 73 1988 1999 1997 2.472 600$        19,000$      9,290$     3,972$     15,217   265,328   104,060   48,092    
GMC YUKON 312 1993 2003 2000 1.569 1,500$     43,250$      18,378$   7,215$     5,203     178,463   60,832     29,929    
HONDA ACCORD 1111 1986 2003 1998 3.527 150$        20,000$      8,135$     4,640$     3,740     278,352   78,307     49,566    
HONDA CIVIC 729 1984 2003 1998 3.324 175$        17,700$      6,538$     3,542$     428        282,015   70,908     45,690    
HONDA CRV 199 1997 2003 2000 1.208 4,750$     20,000$      11,174$   2,901$     1,559     149,397   52,695     26,988    
HONDA ODYSSEY 81 1995 2003 2000 1.583 2,750$     25,000$      15,324$   5,095$     6,077     169,720   55,819     32,126    
HONDA OTHER 22 1989 2003 1997 5.520 325$        28,200$      11,120$   10,535$   2,593     146,260   66,576     56,790    
HONDA PASSPORT 102 1994 2002 1998 1.989 1,150$     17,600$      8,790$     4,112$     14,017   167,723   67,966     35,212    
HONDA PRELUDE 58 1985 2001 1995 4.517 150$        16,600$      6,316$     5,527$     20,716   244,637   108,157   59,149    
HONDA S2000 18 2000 2002 2001 0.752 18,200$   25,300$      22,394$   2,227$     3,644     55,454     22,703     14,213    
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HUMMER H1 4 1995 2001 1997 2.630 27,600$   52,000$      37,025$   10,903$   6,242     76,987     40,994     29,393    
HUMMER H2 38 2003 2003 2003 0.000 15,700$   51,500$      47,318$   5,563$     554        34,746     12,140     8,311      
HYUNDAI ACCENT 164 1995 2003 2001 1.872 250$        9,100$        4,211$     2,266$     3,076     143,617   36,682     29,779    
HYUNDAI ELANTRA 258 1992 2003 2001 2.116 150$        11,000$      6,309$     2,939$     2,231     145,356   33,826     28,814    
HYUNDAI OTHER 36 1988 2003 1998 3.264 125$        14,100$      4,466$     3,661$     5,422     137,266   63,075     34,182    
HYUNDAI SANTAFE 44 2001 2003 2002 0.642 8,800$     17,700$      13,919$   2,690$     2,202     67,242     25,193     16,422    
HYUNDAI SONATA 235 1995 2003 2001 1.522 400$        13,200$      8,405$     3,271$     1,438     146,935   32,739     25,351    
HYUNDAI XGSERIES 29 2001 2002 2002 0.471 4,800$     14,000$      11,997$   1,916$     3,888     41,667     21,834     8,807      
INFINITI GSERIES 38 1991 2003 1997 3.745 1,200$     27,200$      7,880$     7,339$     8,600     179,795   82,128     50,713    
INFINITI ISERIES 194 1996 2003 1999 1.340 2,800$     24,100$      12,544$   4,039$     6,709     167,157   51,630     27,201    
INFINITI JSERIES 38 1990 2000 1995 2.062 625$        16,000$      4,053$     3,003$     33,928   176,801   108,852   28,451    
INFINITI QSERIES 186 1990 2003 1999 2.108 1,000$     33,400$      15,816$   5,665$     8,107     167,575   54,212     28,069    
ISUZU OTHER 61 1986 2002 1998 2.957 400$        14,200$      3,616$     3,214$     12,282   220,157   79,018     42,083    
ISUZU RODEO 347 1991 2002 1999 2.468 400$        14,500$      6,830$     3,571$     2,873     183,651   62,043     38,397    
ISUZU TROOPER 84 1986 2002 1998 3.455 300$        14,300$      6,616$     3,539$     7,925     197,761   74,159     43,316    
JAGUAR STYPE 297 2000 2003 2001 1.026 7,200$     48,000$      23,733$   5,056$     1,039     103,816   31,195     14,791    
JAGUAR XTYPE 308 1984 2003 1999 3.485 200$        75,500$      23,361$   12,103$   1,304     219,699   43,735     32,269    
JEEP CHEROKEE 466 1987 2002 1998 3.155 100$        18,100$      6,548$     3,410$     6,079     244,349   71,615     43,573    
JEEP GCHEROKEE 1468 1986 2003 1999 2.097 225$        27,600$      10,659$   4,424$     1,791     236,409   63,031     35,139    
JEEP OTHER 80 1987 2003 2002 2.821 225$        19,500$      14,917$   3,318$     2,374     168,356   26,811     24,948    
JEEP WRANGLER 350 1988 2003 1998 2.858 900$        19,300$      9,672$     4,209$     4,478     185,147   57,836     33,612    
KIA OPTIMA 99 2001 2003 2002 0.460 2,200$     11,900$      8,362$     1,844$     6,663     88,869     22,548     11,637    
KIA RIO 79 2001 2003 2002 0.543 350$        6,400$        3,791$     1,214$     1,983     69,894     27,179     14,146    
KIA SEPHIA 133 1994 2001 1999 1.456 200$        5,300$        1,956$     1,070$     16,445   137,190   58,790     25,618    
KIA SPORTAGE 226 1995 2002 2000 1.696 100$        10,500$      4,630$     2,544$     4,386     120,773   50,965     28,634    
KIA SSERIES 86 2000 2003 2002 0.807 1,800$     15,800$      5,086$     2,790$     2,405     96,078     24,760     17,312    
LANDROVR DISCOVERY 261 1995 2003 2001 2.252 3,200$     32,000$      18,310$   6,573$     3,084     130,245   36,083     29,420    
LANDROVR FREELANDER 60 2002 2003 2002 0.279 15,000$   24,000$      17,694$   2,023$     2,098     29,652     8,580       4,635      
LANDROVR RANGEROVER 94 1989 2003 1999 2.744 2,500$     63,000$      25,602$   17,450$   3,850     200,543   51,330     33,770    
LEXUS ECLASS 264 1990 2003 1998 2.573 1,750$     32,700$      13,415$   6,324$     2,279     221,006   62,932     38,392    
LEXUS GCLASS 132 1993 2002 1999 1.695 4,400$     34,500$      20,217$   5,137$     1,783     202,854   54,955     28,773    
LEXUS LSCLASS 106 1990 2003 1996 4.088 2,000$     50,500$      16,122$   13,246$   6,493     234,222   93,338     54,712    
LEXUS LXCLASS 72 1996 2002 2000 1.146 13,100$   49,200$      28,634$   6,268$     7,319     100,120   54,587     20,509    
LEXUS OTHER 27 2001 2003 2002 0.784 13,000$   50,000$      25,363$   10,466$   578        99,994     25,955     20,206    
LEXUS RXCLASS 356 1999 2003 2000 0.589 6,500$     39,700$      20,749$   3,123$     778        102,637   44,988     14,688    
LEXUS SCCLASS 35 1992 2003 1998 4.147 3,200$     55,000$      29,869$   21,044$   1,637     161,493   58,686     54,753    
LINCOLN CONTINENTAL 205 1962 2002 1999 4.113 125$        23,600$      11,758$   6,146$     4,805     153,649   48,939     32,357    
LINCOLN LS 374 2000 2002 2000 0.627 5,100$     27,000$      16,367$   3,107$     5,857     122,240   37,417     15,641    
LINCOLN MARK 52 1986 1998 1995 3.060 250$        11,900$      4,381$     3,077$     14,517   191,204   95,060     39,022    
LINCOLN NAVIGATOR 415 1998 2003 2000 1.088 8,900$     43,600$      21,212$   5,015$     1,747     161,674   51,512     23,288    
LINCOLN TOWNCAR 501 1986 2003 1999 3.395 100$        30,000$      12,772$   7,295$     4,757     297,933   59,223     43,745    
MAZDA 15 1997 2002 2001 1.944 2,600$     9,200$        7,770$     2,331$     24,258   79,137     34,546     19,024    
MAZDA 6SERIES 619 1988 2002 2000 2.869 225$        11,000$      7,025$     3,309$     2,263     230,189   50,061     40,420    
MAZDA BSERIES 142 1986 2003 1998 3.408 1,075$     14,100$      6,693$     3,080$     4,673     216,275   64,687     47,362    
MAZDA MIATA 59 1990 2003 1998 3.238 700$        16,300$      9,308$     4,554$     143        143,680   49,399     34,480    
MAZDA MILLENIA 86 1995 2002 1998 2.139 200$        17,100$      7,490$     4,503$     7,281     175,420   72,766     36,299    
MAZDA MPV 97 1989 2003 1999 3.431 200$        19,000$      8,579$     5,518$     104        177,415   61,548     43,198    
MAZDA MXSERIES 31 1988 1996 1993 2.092 100$        3,300$        1,348$     782$        56,200   204,786   117,441   32,685    
MAZDA OTHER 24 1989 1995 1992 1.459 450$        13,500$      2,569$     2,550$     48,660   249,047   108,949   48,135    
MAZDA PROTEGE 300 1991 2003 2000 2.667 200$        13,100$      6,794$     3,240$     58          180,149   43,748     35,664    
MAZDA TRIBUTE 37 2001 2003 2001 0.599 9,000$     22,400$      15,173$   3,180$     7,172     83,278     34,596     21,067    
MERCEDES CCLASS 278 1975 2003 1999 3.364 175$        109,000$    19,653$   16,789$   2            238,729   50,722     34,285    
MERCEDES CLK 112 1998 2003 2000 1.179 15,200$   59,200$      33,720$   9,182$     104        111,790   34,322     19,050    
MERCEDES ECLASS 364 1979 2003 1998 3.680 500$        52,400$      21,401$   10,416$   1,984     268,308   61,661     40,936    
MERCEDES GCLASS 4 2002 2002 2002 0.000 52,250$   56,250$      54,225$   1,826$     9,610     25,179     16,514     6,813      
MERCEDES MLCLASS 280 1998 2003 2000 0.977 9,100$     48,600$      21,628$   5,183$     1,103     113,514   45,088     18,659    
MERCEDES ROADSTER 106 1993 2003 1999 2.720 14,400$   129,000$    46,200$   27,335$   29          112,221   35,695     25,126    
MERCEDES SCLASS 293 1970 2002 1996 5.568 350$        79,500$      28,178$   16,592$   5,116     265,302   69,747     42,138    
MERCEDES SLK 96 1998 2002 2000 1.053 15,700$   37,700$      25,264$   4,186$     5,347     87,171     32,345     16,142    
MERCURY COUGAR 222 1986 2002 1999 3.018 100$        15,200$      6,620$     3,259$     4,915     247,471   55,949     33,747    
MERCURY GMARQUIS 335 1985 2003 1999 3.174 400$        17,600$      8,775$     4,408$     5,710     197,594   53,558     35,938    
MERCURY MTNEER 330 1997 2003 2000 1.587 2,150$     22,400$      12,844$   4,726$     5,832     165,493   47,307     26,496    
MERCURY MYSTIQUE 81 1995 2000 1998 1.725 250$        7,800$        2,567$     1,628$     16,606   145,730   78,971     28,757    
MERCURY OTHER 17 1991 2003 1997 4.989 100$        24,300$      8,484$     10,492$   121        110,673   53,296     38,825    
MERCURY SABLE 857 1988 2003 2001 2.288 125$        15,300$      7,597$     2,962$     2,466     203,878   37,418     30,791    
MERCURY TRACER 27 1991 1999 1997 2.082 100$        2,500$        1,242$     754$        33,449   163,484   99,252     29,108    
MERCURY VILLAGER 215 1993 2002 1998 2.466 350$        15,400$      5,892$     3,719$     11,126   184,688   77,893     40,374    
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MITSUB 3000GT 32 1991 1999 1995 2.590 300$        17,100$      6,986$     4,291$     14,466   169,203   94,602     37,641    
MITSUB DIAMANTE 171 1992 2003 2001 2.721 500$        20,100$      11,165$   4,523$     2,199     194,047   33,742     42,687    
MITSUB ECLIPSE 382 1990 2003 1999 2.958 100$        19,500$      8,318$     4,545$     263        197,465   55,758     36,615    
MITSUB GALANT 573 1988 2003 2001 2.359 200$        12,800$      6,907$     2,801$     1,072     155,918   43,214     30,537    
MITSUB LANCER 141 2002 2003 2002 0.420 900$        10,600$      7,714$     1,425$     898        52,402     20,955     8,755      
MITSUB MIRAGE 198 1989 2002 2000 2.507 125$        7,900$        3,889$     1,758$     3,538     167,279   47,024     37,297    
MITSUB MONTERO 469 1989 2003 2001 2.311 425$        26,000$      13,034$   5,628$     2,273     173,914   44,309     35,597    
MITSUB OTHER 7 1988 1995 1993 2.673 200$        2,600$        1,164$     766$        77,511   168,631   119,408   33,410    
MITSUB OUTLANDER 84 2003 2003 2003 0.000 7,100$     15,700$      14,933$   993$        2,102     24,805     7,976       3,896      
NISSAN 2SERIES 48 1989 1998 1995 2.816 500$        8,000$        2,217$     1,433$     42,928   229,679   108,853   38,140    
NISSAN 3SERIES 42 1984 2003 1994 6.652 100$        30,250$      11,361$   11,264$   1,280     175,837   77,147     56,485    
NISSAN ALTIMA 685 1993 2003 1999 2.281 400$        19,600$      7,589$     3,876$     4,511     225,820   53,296     36,183    
NISSAN ECONCLASS 18 1986 2002 1996 6.382 200$        9,100$        4,172$     3,591$     10,492   165,085   75,255     59,165    
NISSAN FRONTIER 234 1984 2003 1999 3.465 500$        18,700$      8,794$     4,941$     65          198,214   58,167     39,686    
NISSAN KINGCAB 21 1986 1996 1993 3.491 650$        5,000$        2,642$     1,181$     52,724   233,852   137,848   52,607    
NISSAN MAXIMA 735 1987 2003 2000 3.050 100$        22,600$      11,908$   4,943$     167        231,884   51,560     40,928    
NISSAN PATHFINDER 393 1988 2003 1999 2.811 475$        24,000$      11,254$   5,454$     4,701     241,188   65,488     39,656    
NISSAN QUEST 159 1993 2002 1998 2.339 650$        18,900$      7,072$     3,853$     9,597     251,560   78,843     42,539    
NISSAN SENTRA 386 1987 2003 1999 3.696 175$        13,600$      5,005$     3,288$     4,066     227,729   67,431     47,063    
NISSAN XE 23 1991 1997 1995 1.593 300$        6,900$        2,792$     1,595$     35,838   232,132   103,552   46,161    
NISSAN XTERRA 152 2000 2003 2001 0.924 7,500$     17,600$      13,847$   2,331$     6,366     100,516   38,157     18,157    
OLDSMO ALERO 169 1999 2003 2001 1.175 2,200$     10,100$      6,805$     1,904$     10,572   150,868   44,077     22,616    
OLDSMO AURORA 22 1994 2001 1998 2.262 200$        12,100$      4,952$     3,851$     24,926   150,337   87,918     32,482    
OLDSMO BRAVADA 23 1993 2003 1998 1.929 1,650$     19,600$      7,009$     4,422$     28,047   161,168   81,908     32,456    
OLDSMO CUTLASS 35 1983 1999 1993 4.059 225$        6,200$        1,847$     1,410$     10,812   219,666   101,645   42,342    
OLDSMO EIGHTYEIGHT 28 1987 1999 1993 3.395 200$        6,450$        2,046$     1,758$     36,686   161,243   97,961     35,941    
OLDSMO INTRIGUE 71 1992 2002 1999 1.516 300$        9,600$        4,765$     2,105$     20,513   161,526   70,388     28,554    
OLDSMO SILHOUETTE 14 1996 2002 1999 1.859 1,900$     12,800$      7,196$     3,586$     27,295   119,215   70,354     32,350    
PLYMTH ACCLAIM 35 1987 1995 1992 1.927 100$        2,350$        748$        600$        31,347   248,663   102,711   46,314    
PLYMTH BREEZE 153 1996 2000 1998 1.073 450$        6,300$        3,397$     1,529$     12,744   135,717   65,259     30,608    
PLYMTH ECONCLASS 10 1988 1999 1993 3.091 100$        5,900$        2,120$     2,135$     49,895   210,598   106,635   52,806    
PLYMTH GVOYAGER 203 1988 2000 1997 2.640 100$        11,300$      4,183$     2,778$     20,822   216,481   90,701     37,537    
PLYMTH LASER 10 1990 1994 1992 1.337 100$        1,800$        915$        577$        78,918   153,099   112,370   26,347    
PLYMTH NEON 139 1995 2001 1998 1.916 300$        6,100$        2,420$     1,424$     15,253   156,680   73,231     28,773    
PLYMTH PROWLER 6 1999 2001 2000 0.753 23,400$   25,500$      24,500$   839$        2,792     36,852     11,643     13,591    
PLYMTH VILLAGER 9 1993 1999 1996 2.007 1,650$     11,400$      4,611$     2,928$     31,594   136,030   95,214     36,375    
PLYMTH VOYAGER 162 1987 2002 1997 3.018 100$        14,000$      3,486$     2,808$     7,013     223,556   90,796     44,458    
PONTIAC AZTEK 30 2001 2003 2001 0.661 5,700$     14,150$      9,953$     2,153$     3,338     95,522     38,154     22,984    
PONTIAC BONNEVILLE 227 1987 2003 1998 3.427 200$        17,600$      6,788$     4,770$     10,057   235,027   78,810     46,411    
PONTIAC FIREBIRD 152 1987 2002 1998 2.996 100$        26,500$      8,734$     5,527$     3,880     208,232   65,893     36,657    
PONTIAC GRANDAM 919 1987 2003 1999 2.630 100$        15,400$      5,700$     2,990$     321        246,454   61,212     36,819    
PONTIAC GRANDPRIX 664 1990 2003 1999 2.557 100$        16,600$      6,890$     3,360$     1,177     187,307   64,379     34,871    
PONTIAC MONTANA 225 1990 2003 1999 2.379 400$        16,700$      8,007$     4,105$     1,802     223,509   65,160     34,730    
PONTIAC SIXTHOUS 8 1978 1991 1989 4.438 160$        1,200$        556$        462$        27,261   229,058   133,149   69,592    
PONTIAC SUNBIRD 27 1985 2002 1993 3.657 150$        6,300$        1,140$     1,390$     33,234   170,971   114,716   34,399    
PONTIAC SUNFIRE 293 1990 2003 2000 2.126 400$        10,000$      4,709$     2,095$     620        190,487   53,749     34,285    
PONTIAC TRANSAM 10 1996 2002 1999 1.897 5,000$     22,200$      14,700$   5,145$     3,872     89,455     42,166     26,920    
PONTIAC TRANSSPORT 9 1994 2003 1997 2.635 1,400$     16,400$      4,678$     4,678$     24,896   156,449   98,956     39,193    
PONTIAC VIBE 9 2003 2003 2003 0.000 10,100$   15,700$      12,706$   1,859$     4,398     60,707     16,799     17,008    
PORSCHE 9SERIES 138 1965 2003 1997 6.033 1,400$     91,000$      40,350$   19,254$   1,294     151,401   39,234     26,931    
PORSCHE BOXSTER 103 1997 2003 2000 1.318 16,500$   42,700$      26,711$   5,537$     2,130     80,066     29,876     16,442    
SAAB 9-3 251 1999 2002 2000 0.599 5,300$     30,750$      14,192$   4,109$     8,329     91,352     36,677     12,942    
SAAB 9-5 88 1999 2001 2000 0.525 5,500$     22,100$      14,021$   3,530$     10,112   94,149     42,416     15,503    
SAAB NINEHUNDR 42 1986 1998 1995 2.568 150$        12,000$      4,327$     2,625$     38,819   143,866   84,163     27,171    
SATURN LCLASS 181 2000 2003 2000 0.860 3,000$     13,500$      7,348$     1,637$     2,839     102,618   34,855     15,674    
SATURN SCLASS 720 1991 2002 1998 2.511 125$        15,600$      3,746$     2,076$     1,072     196,912   64,589     37,157    
SATURN VUE 5 2002 2003 2003 0.447 13,000$   18,100$      15,920$   1,862$     3,414     23,583     14,749     7,568      
SUBARU BAJA 7 2003 2003 2003 0.000 18,000$   18,600$      18,243$   237$        5,267     13,411     8,741       2,755      
SUBARU FORESTER 168 1998 2003 2001 1.316 4,400$     20,200$      12,692$   3,246$     5,123     115,334   37,773     22,767    
SUBARU IMPREZA 58 1985 2003 2000 3.633 225$        19,300$      10,617$   5,906$     2,449     220,315   47,065     43,121    
SUBARU LEGACY 128 1990 2003 1998 3.777 100$        19,800$      9,016$     5,987$     1,820     228,398   62,478     49,087    
SUBARU OUTBACK 214 1997 2003 2001 1.496 2,350$     24,500$      14,310$   3,663$     1,294     176,403   36,274     26,488    
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SUZUKI GVITARA 211 1999 2003 2001 1.538 3,000$     17,700$      10,919$   3,685$     931        114,297   30,262     22,077    
SUZUKI SIDEKICK 33 1992 1998 1996 1.691 875$        5,100$        2,565$     1,257$     22,689   167,451   86,707     32,141    
SUZUKI VITARA 25 1996 2002 2000 1.451 1,900$     11,200$      6,306$     2,204$     3,277     120,414   46,624     26,122    
TOYOTA 4RUNNER 357 1987 2003 1998 2.881 500$        26,700$      12,798$   5,863$     4,588     250,427   74,763     42,679    
TOYOTA AVALON 173 1995 2003 1999 1.858 1,400$     25,800$      12,573$   5,523$     2,278     174,999   57,426     34,526    
TOYOTA CAMRY 1355 1984 2003 1999 3.457 100$        24,200$      9,450$     4,577$     198        238,695   57,236     44,410    
TOYOTA CELICA 119 1985 2002 1997 4.489 100$        17,150$      8,316$     5,200$     14,033   228,575   72,589     48,867    
TOYOTA COROLLA 704 1981 2003 1999 3.665 175$        19,000$      6,394$     3,529$     1,751     227,725   59,003     44,714    
TOYOTA ECHO 28 2000 2003 2001 1.243 1,000$     10,900$      6,307$     2,742$     3,231     81,621     36,633     24,798    
TOYOTA HIGHLAND 21 2001 2003 2002 0.902 15,300$   26,600$      22,071$   2,467$     105        51,339     24,668     12,949    
TOYOTA LANDCRSR 96 1974 2002 1998 3.429 3,100$     35,200$      21,274$   8,093$     16,608   212,136   69,317     36,828    
TOYOTA MR2 20 1985 2002 1998 5.753 300$        19,400$      11,875$   6,885$     3,832     219,234   61,464     65,366    
TOYOTA PASEO 10 1992 1996 1994 1.549 200$        1,800$        883$        593$        99,392   176,214   134,897   27,494    
TOYOTA PREVIA 33 1991 1996 1993 1.542 800$        6,200$        2,927$     1,185$     23,389   192,550   131,997   36,598    
TOYOTA RAV4 166 1996 2003 1999 1.733 2,750$     19,100$      9,452$     3,886$     151        185,311   60,464     34,050    
TOYOTA SEQUOIA 34 2001 2003 2002 0.719 16,500$   35,800$      28,559$   4,698$     3,626     176,860   37,340     36,986    
TOYOTA SIENNA 153 1998 2003 2000 1.174 4,950$     25,400$      12,735$   3,935$     120        175,985   54,232     27,250    
TOYOTA SOLARA 60 1999 2003 2000 1.295 4,800$     24,600$      11,269$   3,721$     7,562     129,259   50,147     24,368    
TOYOTA T100 44 1986 1998 1993 3.548 200$        10,600$      3,548$     2,598$     74,744   222,051   126,824   40,024    
TOYOTA TACOMA 257 1990 2003 1999 1.874 750$        22,200$      10,090$   4,354$     1,446     237,752   60,395     38,270    
TOYOTA TERCEL 48 1988 1998 1994 2.364 100$        3,600$        1,210$     815$        50,521   212,979   118,565   32,318    
TOYOTA TUNDRA 61 1999 2003 2001 0.985 9,400$     25,000$      16,343$   3,744$     1,223     148,985   43,081     26,942    
VOLKS BEETLE 314 1998 2003 2000 0.990 3,000$     24,500$      9,540$     2,518$     119        106,677   35,789     15,885    
VOLKS CABRIO 65 1990 2002 1998 2.599 1,125$     36,500$      9,293$     4,910$     15,336   145,505   55,626     30,061    
VOLKS GOLF 83 1989 2003 1999 3.225 100$        17,300$      7,804$     4,918$     1,705     241,494   59,238     47,201    
VOLKS JETTA 516 1984 2003 1999 2.149 100$        19,700$      9,086$     3,862$     5,020     177,983   48,553     29,699    
VOLKS OTHER 11 1993 2003 2001 3.828 800$        25,300$      17,050$   8,589$     6,687     129,716   31,614     43,921    
VOLKS PASSAT 243 1990 2003 2000 1.753 1,000$     37,500$      12,164$   5,410$     2,197     133,364   43,722     23,941    
VOLVO C70 38 1998 2003 2000 1.260 4,100$     33,400$      19,521$   6,220$     5,818     110,830   39,074     21,788    
VOLVO OTHER 94 1981 2003 1993 4.222 100$        34,000$      3,505$     5,028$     2,300     232,529   119,873   49,205    
VOLVO S40 103 2000 2002 2001 0.939 7,500$     31,000$      13,154$   3,082$     7,344     72,184     25,758     17,611    
VOLVO S60 145 2001 2002 2002 0.164 11,900$   24,800$      19,983$   1,286$     4,214     58,556     16,794     5,472      
VOLVO S70 52 1998 2000 1999 0.866 4,400$     15,800$      10,921$   3,160$     15,941   110,813   55,818     22,443    
VOLVO S80 148 1998 2002 2001 1.197 7,500$     30,100$      18,606$   5,249$     2,076     106,393   35,546     22,331    
VOLVO VCLASS 132 1998 2003 2001 1.220 6,100$     30,300$      19,354$   7,112$     1,199     102,372   41,058     21,634    
TOTAL 70,058
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ACURA COUPE 236 1989 2003 1998 3.140 400$        65,000$      11,215$   7,566$     5,656       268,401   61,744     45,313       
ACURA SEDAN 477 1987 2003 1999 2.770 200$        29,500$      14,349$   5,778$     4,175       233,772   56,854     36,669       
ACURA SUV 23 1996 2002 2000 2.397 2,800$     33,800$      20,767$   10,838$   12,574     132,332   55,498     33,974       
AUDI COUPE 46 1990 2002 2000 2.092 5,200$     33,000$      22,139$   5,909$     2,608       77,016     29,214     18,032       
AUDI SEDAN 410 1984 2003 2000 2.220 500$        55,700$      17,075$   6,710$     1,305       164,799   45,580     25,081       
AUDI WAGON 63 1996 2003 2000 1.529 7,600$     51,000$      20,138$   8,264$     1,433       111,112   39,922     21,727       
BMW COUPE 308 1983 2003 1999 3.199 400$        101,000$    21,226$   11,961$   823          233,952   47,211     36,527       
BMW SEDAN 688 1983 2003 1999 3.185 300$        66,000$      22,396$   12,054$   1,585       252,800   53,461     37,443       
BMW SUV 123 2000 2003 2001 0.633 12,300$   52,400$      32,473$   4,761$     1,973       84,458     38,843     15,257       
BMW WAGON 19 1988 2002 1998 3.761 850$        29,000$      18,434$   8,026$     12,937     145,429   51,661     36,546       
BUICK COUPE 56 1983 1998 1994 3.808 275$        9,300$        2,985$     2,295$     38,898     211,505   102,519   41,093       
BUICK SEDAN 870 1986 2003 1998 3.692 150$        20,500$      6,187$     4,344$     1,473       226,056   67,390     41,834       
BUICK SUV 12 2002 2002 2002 0.000 13,800$   22,500$      16,175$   2,614$     12,790     41,556     23,930     8,541         
BUICK WAGON 10 1986 1996 1993 2.961 600$        5,500$        1,945$     1,459$     37,077     150,702   107,480   41,544       
CADILLAC COUPE 73 1976 2001 1995 4.946 150$        26,260$      8,036$     6,653$     6,690       223,199   77,668     38,146       
CADILLAC SEDAN 633 1973 2003 1997 3.769 200$        31,200$      9,924$     7,787$     1,346       213,821   73,490     39,444       
CADILLAC SUV 122 1999 2003 2001 1.286 9,900$     47,000$      27,340$   8,791$     3,436       137,445   43,284     20,914       
CHEVY COUPE 1082 1964 2003 1998 4.285 150$        44,750$      8,627$     8,392$     216          208,603   63,660     39,211       
CHEVY PICKUP 2356 1983 2003 1999 3.034 250$        35,500$      9,956$     5,592$     296          288,601   69,743     44,320       
CHEVY SEDAN 1758 1962 2003 2000 2.967 100$        17,300$      5,507$     3,066$     114          229,394   58,213     37,811       
CHEVY SUV 2161 1981 2003 1999 2.817 200$        34,500$      12,324$   7,191$     977          286,436   68,430     40,710       
CHEVY VAN 895 1981 2003 1998 3.294 125$        35,300$      6,668$     4,086$     5,493       276,616   78,359     43,958       
CHEVY WAGON 22 1990 1995 1992 1.469 350$        3,600$        1,332$     774$        39,710     279,906   124,030   48,057       
CHRYSLER COUPE 301 1987 2003 1999 2.850 100$        34,000$      8,249$     5,124$     3,173       170,936   57,530     36,083       
CHRYSLER SEDAN 789 1986 2003 1999 2.990 150$        21,600$      7,794$     4,327$     43            175,484   57,294     34,475       
CHRYSLER VAN 320 1992 2003 1999 2.208 400$        35,100$      8,791$     4,827$     1,629       204,156   64,183     35,592       
DAEWOO COUPE 6 2000 2002 2001 0.816 700$        5,000$        2,317$     1,525$     19,714     68,045     43,159     22,420       
DAEWOO SEDAN 108 1999 2002 2000 0.778 400$        6,200$        3,026$     1,470$     7,687       84,678     36,848     18,685       
DAEWOO WAGON 5 1999 2001 2000 0.707 600$        5,500$        3,060$     1,756$     18,827     97,326     42,921     31,150       
DODGE COUPE 151 1989 2003 1997 2.841 275$        84,500$      5,621$     10,765$   13            179,576   77,956     38,715       
DODGE PICKUP 1708 1978 2003 1999 2.446 200$        29,800$      10,554$   5,347$     2,166       244,920   65,718     38,547       
DODGE SEDAN 2099 1989 2003 2001 2.496 100$        14,200$      6,219$     3,170$     105          175,278   46,578     34,434       
DODGE SUV 761 1989 2003 2000 1.074 400$        24,800$      12,348$   3,005$     869          142,521   51,010     22,652       
DODGE VAN 1299 1985 2003 1999 2.959 200$        20,000$      7,257$     4,707$     2,496       236,084   68,348     42,284       
EAGLE COUPE 29 1990 1998 1996 1.831 400$        4,100$        2,659$     1,090$     54,197     195,426   96,001     33,467       
EAGLE SEDAN 33 1989 1998 1996 2.454 200$        3,900$        2,253$     1,377$     32,987     179,916   86,714     38,884       
FORD COUPE 1434 1969 2003 1999 3.383 100$        28,600$      7,628$     5,032$     125          203,949   53,751     37,644       
FORD PICKUP 4259 1976 2003 1999 2.755 250$        35,000$      10,648$   5,974$     1,062       252,736   58,296     38,506       
FORD SEDAN 3479 1984 2003 2000 2.546 100$        18,000$      5,733$     3,097$     303          200,784   49,924     34,646       
FORD SUV 4129 1981 2003 2000 2.558 175$        37,500$      11,683$   5,450$     466          219,329   55,201     32,456       
FORD VAN 2125 1978 2003 1999 2.507 100$        26,000$      7,954$     4,452$     2,824       271,123   63,683     42,320       
FORD WAGON 219 1990 2003 1998 3.044 150$        13,500$      4,641$     3,569$     1,472       256,127   60,628     40,937       
GEO COUPE 44 1990 2001 1995 2.922 100$        3,000$        1,208$     780$        31,790     230,438   88,381     36,791       
GEO SEDAN 207 1990 2002 1999 2.669 150$        8,600$        3,701$     1,994$     6,575       240,571   60,209     36,779       
GEO SUV 175 1989 2003 1999.3 2.602866 550 13300 5934.7143 2934.6863 4421 199829 50783.086 32127.8098
GMC PICKUP 666 1984 2003 1999 2.924 150$        30,100$      9,988$     5600.769 1,772       235,962   72,626     43219.354
GMC SUV 678 1984 2003 1999 2.498 200$        43,250$      13,074$   7,844$     3,661       265,328   68,601     38,630       
GMC VAN 145 1986 2003 1997 3.669 400$        25,000$      6,197$     4,882$     6,586       208,706   89,107     45,551       
HONDA COUPE 675 1984 2003 1998 3.479 150$        25,300$      7,920$     5,082$     428          282,015   74,742     48,201       
HONDA SEDAN 1243 1986 2003 1998 3.554 150$        20,000$      7,440$     4,259$     3,740       278,352   76,271     49,191       
HONDA SUV 309 1994 2003 1999 1.710 1,150$     28,200$      10,720$   4,170$     1,559       167,723   56,559     31,481       
HONDA VAN 81 1995 2003 2000 1.583 2,750$     25,000$      15,324$   5,095$     6,077       169,720   55,819     32,126       
HONDA WAGON 12 1990 1997 1993 2.038 750$        4,200$        2,708$     1,158$     86,722     198,884   127,052   35,243       
HUMMER SUV 42 1995 2003 2002 1.851 15,700$   52,000$      46,338$   6,781$     554          76,987     14,888     14,108       
HYUNDAI COUPE 85 1992 2003 1999 2.562 200$        14,100$      3,481$     2,815$     3,076       137,266   51,075     32,363       
HYUNDAI SEDAN 632 1988 2003 2001 1.841 125$        14,000$      7,118$     3,346$     1,438       146,935   32,521     26,886       
HYUNDAI SUV 44 2001 2003 2002 0.642 8,800$     17,700$      13,919$   2,690$     2,202       67,242     25,193     16,422       
HYUNDAI WAGON 5 1996 1999 1997 1.304 675$        2,700$        1,440$     830$        64,374     126,120   89,129     23,511       
INFINITI SEDAN 333 1990 2003 1998 2.635 625$        33,400$      11,366$   6,150$     6,709       179,795   64,658     37,695       
INFINITI SUV 123 1997 2003 2000 1.169 6,600$     25,600$      16,617$   3,955$     9,664       110,866   47,365     19,030       
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ISUZU PICKUP 28 1986 2000 1997 3.304 400$        5,600$        1,986$     1,448$     33,035     220,157   107,592   40,765       
ISUZU SEDAN 10 1998 2002 2001 1.075 750$        4,300$        2,955$     1,393$     28,489     112,906   49,967     24,689       
ISUZU SUV 454 1986 2002 1999 2.682 300$        14,500$      6,743$     3,585$     2,873       197,761   64,022     39,037       
JAGUAR COUPE 45 1989 2002 1999 3.017 3,650$     75,500$      31,880$   13,671$   1,304       94,309     40,366     22,341       
JAGUAR SEDAN 560 1984 2003 2000 2.712 200$        55,500$      22,874$   8,560$     1,039       219,699   37,355     26,274       
JEEP SUV 2364 1986 2003 1999 2.572 100$        27,600$      9,847$     4,566$     1,791       244,349   62,729     37,292       
KIA SEDAN 386 1994 2003 2001 1.499 200$        11,900$      4,444$     2,872$     1,983       137,190   36,678     24,919       
KIA SUV 226 1995 2002 2000 1.696 100$        10,500$      4,630$     2,544$     4,386       120,773   50,965     28,634       
KIA WAGON 11 2002 2003 2002 0.302 4,200$     15,800$      9,964$     4,037$     6,206       43,016     15,475     10,549       
LANDROVR SUV 415 1989 2003 2000 2.386 2,500$     63,000$      19,873$   10,286$   2,098       200,543   35,560     31,064       
LEXUS COUPE 35 1992 2003 1998 4.147 3,200$     55,000$      29,869$   21,044$   1,637       161,493   58,686     54,753       
LEXUS SEDAN 524 1990 2003 1998 3.058 1,750$     50,500$      15,979$   8,424$     1,783       234,222   65,731     42,457       
LEXUS SUV 433 1996 2003 2000 0.792 6,500$     50,000$      22,354$   5,465$     578          102,637   46,109     16,737       
LINCOLN COUPE 50 1986 1998 1995 3.040 250$        11,900$      4,528$     3,045$     14,517     191,204   93,891     39,348       
LINCOLN SEDAN 1082 1962 2003 1999 3.060 100$        30,000$      13,800$   6,241$     4,757       297,933   49,858     35,661       
LINCOLN SUV 415 1998 2003 2000 1.088 8,900$     43,600$      21,212$   5,015$     1,747       161,674   51,512     23,288       
MAZDA COUPE 97 1988 2003 1997 3.840 100$        16,300$      6,630$     5,275$     143          249,047   74,189     50,491       
MAZDA PICKUP 142 1986 2003 1998 3.408 1,075$     14,100$      6,693$     3,080$     4,673       216,275   64,687     47,362       
MAZDA SEDAN 1011 1988 2003 2000 2.913 200$        17,100$      6,869$     3,414$     58            230,189   51,267     40,062       
MAZDA SUV 45 1991 2003 2000 3.701 1,600$     22,400$      12,953$   5,630$     7,172       111,262   41,383     25,851       
MAZDA WAGON 115 1989 2003 1999 3.409 200$        19,000$      8,893$     5,145$     104          177,415   55,823     42,069       
MERCEDES COUPE 395 1973 2003 1999 3.923 600$        129,000$    34,425$   20,689$   2              194,575   39,451     29,447       
MERCEDES SEDAN 843 1970 2003 1998 3.997 175$        79,500$      22,291$   13,236$   101          268,308   60,941     39,436       
MERCEDES SUV 283 1998 2003 2000 1.004 9,100$     56,250$      22,107$   6,431$     1,103       113,514   44,615     18,840       
MERCEDES WAGON 12 1983 2002 1996 5.551 1,600$     33,600$      19,688$   11,250$   13,871     196,128   68,540     49,398       
MERCURY COUPE 227 1986 2002 1998 3.108 100$        15,200$      6,502$     3,320$     4,915       247,471   56,568     33,774       
MERCURY SEDAN 1270 1985 2003 2000 2.727 100$        24,300$      7,552$     3,815$     121          203,878   44,829     34,576       
MERCURY SUV 330 1997 2003 2000 1.587 2,150$     22,400$      12,844$   4,726$     5,832       165,493   47,307     26,496       
MERCURY VAN 215 1993 2002 1998 2.466 350$        15,400$      5,892$     3,719$     11,126     184,688   77,893     40,374       
MERCURY WAGON 42 1993 2002 1998 2.840 475$        12,600$      5,702$     4,349$     4,356       145,739   62,839     39,140       
MITSUB COUPE 532 1989 2003 1999 3.115 100$        19,500$      7,363$     4,396$     263          197,465   53,437     39,402       
MITSUB PICKUP 5 1988 1995 1993 3.050 700$        2,600$        1,290$     775$        80,015     168,631   122,879   32,708       
MITSUB SEDAN 965 1988 2003 2001 2.323 150$        20,100$      7,468$     3,588$     898          194,047   40,073     32,584       
MITSUB SUV 553 1989 2003 2001 2.286 425$        26,000$      13,322$   5,241$     2,102       173,914   38,790     35,312       
MITSUB WAGON 2 1994 1995 1995 0.707 1,500$     2,600$        2,050$     778$        102,460   143,953   123,207   29,340       
NISSAN COUPE 120 1984 2003 1994 4.776 100$        30,250$      5,131$     8,124$     1,280       229,679   100,754   48,458       
NISSAN PICKUP 279 1984 2003 1998 3.847 300$        18,700$      7,817$     5,074$     65            233,852   68,246     47,627       
NISSAN SEDAN 1793 1987 2003 1999 2.852 100$        22,600$      8,880$     4,999$     167          231,884   54,662     40,460       
NISSAN SUV 545 1988 2003 1999 2.642 475$        24,000$      11,977$   4,929$     4,701       241,188   57,866     37,084       
NISSAN VAN 159 1993 2002 1998 2.339 650$        18,900$      7,072$     3,853$     9,597       251,560   78,843     42,539       
OLDSMO COUPE 49 1988 2003 1999 3.698 700$        9,400$        5,594$     2,673$     10,572     219,666   56,691     40,864       
OLDSMO SEDAN 276 1983 2003 1999 3.512 200$        12,100$      5,236$     2,798$     10,812     185,368   64,867     35,289       
OLDSMO SUV 23 1993 2003 1998 1.929 1,650$     19,600$      7,009$     4,422$     28,047     161,168   81,908     32,456       
OLDSMO VAN 14 1996 2002 1999 1.859 1,900$     12,800$      7,196$     3,586$     27,295     119,215   70,354     32,350       
PLYMTH COUPE 40 1990 2001 1996 3.262 100$        25,500$      4,745$     8,444$     2,792       210,598   86,586     47,855       
PLYMTH SEDAN 313 1987 2001 1998 2.692 100$        6,300$        2,779$     1,651$     12,744     248,663   72,061     33,701       
PLYMTH VAN 374 1987 2002 1997 2.800 100$        14,000$      3,892$     2,810$     7,013       223,556   90,851     40,559       
PONTIAC COUPE 767 1978 2003 1998.3 2.990263 100 26500 6110.2412 4171.3156 620 246454 66834.885 38483.1171
PONTIAC SEDAN 1540 1986 2003 1999.3 2.741724 100$        17,600$      6,261$     3,407$     321          241,828   62,429     38,026       
PONTIAC SUV 29 2001 2003 2001 0.670 5,700$     14,150$      9,959$     2190.404 3,338       95,522     38,015     23377.667
PONTIAC VAN 234 1990 2003 1999 2.412 400$        16,700$      7,879$     4,167$     1,802       223,509   66,459     35,422       
PONTIAC WAGON 3 2003 2003 2003 0.000 11,500$   14,900$      13,233$   1,701$     4,398       14,274     10,164     5,142         
PORSCHE COUPE 241 1965 2003 1998 4.866 1,400$     91,000$      34,521$   16,442$   1,294       151,401   35,235     23,462       
SAAB COUPE 162 1986 2002 1999 1.992 150$        30,750$      14,850$   4,826$     9,845       131,032   40,016     19,179       
SAAB SEDAN 196 1991 2002 1999 1.896 325$        26,500$      11,402$   4,567$     8,329       143,866   45,788     23,364       
SAAB WAGON 23 1999 2001 2000 0.475 5,500$     22,100$      14,670$   3,435$     19,573     74,906     44,185     15,973       
SATURN COUPE 166 1991 2002 1998 2.568 325$        10,100$      4,363$     2,369$     13,300     169,811   65,683     36,378       
SATURN SEDAN 687 1992 2003 1999 2.397 125$        13,500$      4,435$     2,397$     1,072       196,912   56,809     36,022       
SATURN SUV 7 2002 2003 2003 0.535 13,000$   18,100$      15,500$   1,807$     3,414       23,583     15,851     6,875         
SATURN WAGON 46 1994 2002 1998 2.098 800$        10,400$      4,933$     2,893$     18,766     123,120   61,842     30,558       
Table 4.6 Frequency of Observations by Body Type
Year Price Mileage
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Make Body Type
No. of 
Obs. MIN MAX MEAN St Dev MIN MAX MEAN St Dev MIN MAX MEAN St Dev
SUBARU SEDAN 400 1985 2003 2000 2.957 100$        24,500$      12,080$   5,436$     1,294       228,398   46,224     39,308       
SUBARU SUV 175 1998 2003 2001 1.357 4,400$     20,200$      12,914$   3,362$     5,123       115,334   36,611     23,028       
SUZUKI SEDAN 122 1995 2003 2002 1.542 500$        11,600$      7,607$     2,745$     3,023       122,689   21,443     24,149       
SUZUKI SUV 269 1992 2003 2000 2.349 875$        17,700$      9,466$     4,441$     931          167,451   38,707     30,201       
SUZUKI WAGON 5 1998 2001 2000 1.304 650$        5,300$        2,820$     1,700$     26,897     68,471     54,505     16,148       
TOYOTA COUPE 269 1985 2003 1997 4.223 100$        24,600$      8,080$     5,700$     198          228,575   74,079     49,864       
TOYOTA PICKUP 362 1986 2003 1999 3.093 200$        25,000$      10,348$   5,323$     1,223       237,752   65,552     43,725       
TOYOTA SEDAN 2236 1981 2003 1999 3.378 100$        25,800$      8,711$     4,696$     1,751       238,695   57,391     43,374       
TOYOTA SUV 670 1974 2003 1999 2.821 500$        35,800$      14,266$   7,670$     105          250,427   66,993     40,794       
TOYOTA VAN 186 1991 2003 1999 2.790 800$        25,400$      10,995$   5,203$     120          192,550   68,029     41,583       
TOYOTA WAGON 16 1987 1996 1992 2.469 475$        5,900$        2,139$     1,592$     64,563     184,452   124,972   34,776       
VOLKS COUPE 429 1987 2003 2000 1.887 100$        36,500$      9,501$     3,328$     119          241,494   40,931     26,374       
VOLKS SEDAN 758 1984 2003 1999 2.023 100$        37,500$      9,759$     4,640$     1,705       177,983   48,244     28,933       
VOLKS VAN 11 1993 2003 2001 3.828 800$        25,300$      17,050$   8,589$     6,687       129,716   31,614     43,921       
VOLKS WAGON 34 1990 2003 2000 2.847 1,000$     28,100$      12,306$   5,429$     6,800       111,821   38,815     26,056       
VOLVO COUPE 40 1983 2003 1999 4.210 1,100$     33,400$      18,593$   7,306$     5,818       77,972     38,780     19,072       
VOLVO SEDAN 517 1981 2002 2000 3.541 100$        31,000$      15,061$   6,730$     2,076       232,529   41,982     41,197       
VOLVO WAGON 155 1990 2003 2000 2.756 500$        34,000$      17,226$   8,784$     1,199       214,259   52,700     39,210       
TOTAL 70,058
Table 4.6 Frequency of Observations by Body Type
Year Price Mileage
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Model 
Before the specific model is presented, the groundwork must be laid. In light of what is 
commonly termed the Lemon Problem, a model should be generated that observes if there are any 
particular hints of this problem in the auction environment. This study is interested in the effects 
that different type of sellers have on the price and depreciation of a vehicle. One might expect 
that buyers in the market will infer some type of quality of a vehicle based on information 
surrounding the vehicle such as who is the one selling it. In essence, an important piece of the 
study is the consequential effects that seller information might have on mileage and age effects. 
The study will also produce results that will shed light on the effects of past purchase history on 
the sale price of a vehicle. 
The log linear model is used for analysis on the broad data set since the broad set 
includes a vast array of makes, models and years. We would expect changes in characteristics to 
have a percentage effect on price rather than a constant dollar effect. Each model was tested for 
heteroscedasticity by White’s test. The advantage with White’s test is that because of its 
generality, the test may be used to identify specification errors other than heteroscedasticity, such 
as functional misspecification errors.52  
X=(x1, … ,xK)              (4.1) 
is the vector of characteristics: number of owners, mileage, year, make, engine size, and four-
wheel drive option among other characteristics.  
                                               
52
 (Warner) Obtain the model by ols as usual. Obtain the ols residuals, ui, and the fitted values, yi. Compute 
the squared ols residuals and the squared fitted values. Regress ui2 on yi and yi2. Keep the R-squared from 
this regression and form either the F or LM statistic and compute the p-value (using F2, n-3 distribution or X2 
distribution)  
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Since the analysis on the broad sample includes a wide variety of vehicle samples, log-
price is the dependent variable as the point of interest will approximately be percentage effects on 
price. The model is given below. 
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where the implicit price is 
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where the coefficients are interpreted as the relative change in kx for a unit change in kβ . For this 
paper, a unit change in an independent variable is approximately associated with a kβ (*100) 
percent change in the price of a vehicle, all other things being equal. 
Dummy variables are incorporated so that the qualitative factors of the vehicle are 
included in the model. Dummy variables will also allow for the quantitative effects to vary by 
make and model. Dummy variables are also interacted with other variable so that the independent 
variable’s incremental effect on price can be estimated. 
This ownership variable, which tracks the number of owners that a vehicle has had over 
the course of its life, was found by using the VIN to track ownership across the life of the vehicle 
using the Carfax database.53 The report that Carfax generates includes an accident check, mileage 
accuracy check, ownership history, recall information, and any warranty details.  
                                               
53Ownership is defined as the retailed transfer of title. Carfax is owned by R.L. Polk, a major automotive 
support firm. 
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Table 4.7 Variable Definitions
Name Description
AGE Age of vehicle
MILES1K mileage/1000
NOWNERS number of previous owners
dummy variables
CYL4 vehicle with engsize less than 6 cylinders
CYL8 vehicle with engsize = to 8 cyl
CYL10 vehicle with engsize equal to or greater than 10 cyl
WHEEL4 4wheel drive vehicle
CONV convertible
COUPENC nonconvertible coupe
WAGON wagon
VAN van
PICKUPREG regular cab pickup
PICKUP4D 4door pickup
PICKUPEXT extended cab pickup
SUV2D suv with only 2 doors
SUV4D suv with 4 doors
DIESELENG vehicles that have diesel engine
GM General Motors vehicle
NONGM A US made vehicle but not by General Motors
BANKFINANCE Bank/Finance is selling the vehicle
DEALER A dealer is selling the vehicle
FLEETLEASE This vehicle was either leased or part of a fleet
ACURA Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Acura
AUDI Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Audi
BMW Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by BMW
BUICK Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Buick
CADILLAC Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Cadillac
CHEVROLET Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Chevrolet
CHRYSLER Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Chrysler
DAEWOO Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Daewoo
DODGE Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Dodge
EAGLE Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Eagle
FORD Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Ford
GEO Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Geo
GMC Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by GMC
HONDA Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Honda
HUMMER Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Hummer
HYUNDAI Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Hyundai
INFINITI Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Infinity
ISUZU Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Isuzu
JAGUAR Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Jaguar
JEEP Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Jeep
KIA Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Kia
LANDROVER Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Landrover
LEXUS Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Lexus
LINCOLN Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Lincoln
MAZDA Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Mazda
MERCEDES Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Mercedes
MERCURY Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Mercury
MITSUBISH Dummy variable, 1 of vehicle is manufactured by Mitsubishi
NISSAN Dummy variable, 1 of vehicle is manufactured by Nissan
OLDSMOBIL Dummy variable, 1 of vehicle is manufactured by Oldsmobile
PLYMOUTH Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Plymouth
PONTIAC Dummy variable, 1 of vehicle is manufactured by Pontiac
PORSCHE Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Porsche
SAAB Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Saab
SATURN Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Saturn
SUBARU Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Subaru
SUZUKI Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Suzuki
TOYOTA Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Toyota
VOLKSWAGE Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Volkswagen
VOLVO Dummy variable, 1 if vehicle is manufactured by Volvo
interaction variables
BANKFINANCEMILES interaction of BANKFINANCE and MILES1K variables
DEALERMILES interaction of DEALER and MILES1K variables
FLEETLEASEMILES interaction of FLEETLEASE and MILES1K variables
BANKFINANCEAGE interaction of BANKFINANCE and AGE variables
DEALERAGE interaction of DEALER and AGE variables
FLEETLEASEAGE interaction of FLEETLEASE and AGE variables
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Empirical Results 
 The first model, which considers the broad sample of vehicles auctioned off across the 
United States, has log-price as the dependent variable. The following table (Table 4.8) gives the 
parameter estimates as well as the relevant t- statistics in parentheses. Dummy variables are 
included to measure out the effects of a foreign vehicle, a General Motors vehicle and a 
nonGeneral Motors vehicle, any convertible effects, and various other effects. The model also 
tested for effects from the order in which the vehicle came to the auction block. The order statistic 
was insignificant at the 5% confidence level. 
 The omitted category in the first broad model is a 6 cyl sedan made by a foreign 
manufacturer. The R^2 is 0.78 and the signs on the parameter estimates are as expected. The 
market discounts the year of the vehicle, mileage and small engine. Model 1 suggests that a brand 
new foreign 6 cyl sedan is roughly $30,000 and for each 1,000 mile increment, the sedan 
depreciated by 0.8%. 
 Model 2 adds dummy variables to account for the person who is selling the vehicle. The 
R^2 improves slightly while all other variables remain statistically significant. The depreciation 
from a unit change in age is roughly 14%. A five-year old car would depreciate to roughly half of 
the car’s purchase price (=EXP(5*0.14)-1). The vehicle that is coming off of a Fleet/Lease 
arrangement is the only one that is discounted relative to the other consignors. 
 Along with the intercept shifters of Bank/Finance sellers, Dealers, and Fleet/Lease 
consignors, Model 3 adds slope shifters by interacting these consignors with mileage and with 
age. In the broad, pooled models, the estimated slope effects from the interaction variables are 
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fairly muted on miles. However, there are some noteworthy interaction effects on age, 
specifically the negative sign on dealer-age. 
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
INTERCEPT 10.309 10.288 10.325 9.780
(2142.57) (1982.629) (1529.11) (1442.245)
AGE -0.141 -0.145 -0.145 -0.164
(-174.87) (-177.153) (-78.447) (-105.769)
MILES1K -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(-125.414) (-125.744) (-69.138) (79.036)
CYL4 -0.518 -0.512 -0.513 -0.373
(-122.548) (-122.183) (-122.483) (-92.314)
CYL8 0.540 0.533 0.534 0.462
(119.869) (119.172) (119.621) (111.788)
CYL10 0.636 0.635 0.638 0.574
(22.691) (22.866) (23.036) (24.834)
WHEEL4 0.117 0.125 0.123 0.102
(21.01) (22.608) (22.358) (21.861)
CONV 0.528 0.513 0.513 0.393
(50.405) (49.346) (49.408) (43.834)
COUPENC 0.116 0.106 0.106 0.074
(19.404) (17.913) (17.879) (14.413)
WAGON 0.097 0.080 0.079 0.048
(6.388) (5.322) (5.272) (3.700)
VAN 0.135 0.133 0.131 0.233
(20.808) (20.718) (20.44) (41.719)
PICKUP4D 0.151 0.137 0.137 0.312
(15.04) (13.7) (13.748) (35.894)
PICKUPEXT 0.218 0.206 0.205 0.339
(28.792) (27.523) (27.327) (50.820)
PICKUPREG 0.055 0.047 0.049 0.166
(6.079) (5.243) (5.527) (21.515)
SUV2D 0.221 0.199 0.201 0.298
(17.756) (16.13) (16.323) (28.056)
SUV4D 0.209 0.198 0.198 0.346
(35.063) (33.539) (33.595) (64.181)
DIESELENG 0.608 0.601 0.605 0.590
(32.432) (32.339) (32.631) (38.234)
GM -0.539 -0.548 -0.546
(-114.943) (-117.896) (-117.454)
NONGM -0.620 -0.627 -0.624
(-148.333) (-151.001) (-150.321)
BANKFINANCE 0.121 0.048 -0.046
(26.594) (4.15) (-4.680)
DEALER 0.081 0.025 -0.049
(19.781) (3.125) (-7.214)
FLEETLEASE -0.085 -0.219 -0.083
(-13.216) (-18.267) (-8.125)
BANKFINANCEMILES -0.001 0.000
(-3.985) (-2.154)
DEALERMILES 0.001 0.001
(9.885) (11.444)
FLEETLEASEMILES -0.001 -0.002
(1.071)* (-5.585)
BANKFINANCEAGE 0.027 0.028
(7.553) (9.428)
DEALERAGE -0.005 0.009
(-2.582) (5.190)
FLEETLEASEAGE 0.037 0.048
(7.673) (11.917)
N 70,058 70,058 70,058 70,058
R-Sq 0.775 0.779 0.781 0.848
Table 4.8 Coefficients of Interest for Broad Sample (Dependent Var is Log Price)
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Model 4 includes MAKE dummies for each of the various vehicle manufacturers in the 
broad sample. The Table does not show each of those MAKE dummies; however, these intercept 
shifters allow the R^2 to increase significantly. Vehicles coming out of a Fleet/Lease arrangement 
continue to be the underperformers. This model drops the GM and nonGM dummies since the 
individual MAKE dummies are included. The omitted variable in this case is Chevy with an 
average new price of just under $18,000 (=EXP(9.780)). The age depreciation effects have 
increased from Models 1, 2, and 3. This is expected since foreign made cars hold their value 
longer than domestic vehicles. 
Table 4.9 illustrates the implicit price effects for the average five-year old car with 
60,000 miles. The economy class vehicles experience a larger depreciation over the five-year 
interval than the more luxurious vehicles. In addition, domestic vehicles take a larger hit with 
mileage effects as well. For example, the lower end of the spectrum include Plymouth, Chrysler, 
Kia, and Daewoo. The upper end of the spectrum include Porsche and Toyota. Although, it is 
interesting that Porsche does well with holding up relative to its age but poorly relative to 
mileage. This indicates that the Porsche may be viewed as a “weekender” vehicle and not a 
vehicle for daily commutes. 
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MAKE NEW PRICE 5YR DEP EFFECT 60K DEP EFFECT USED PRICE
ACURA $38,072 -0.371 -0.507 $11,813
AUDI $45,411 -0.522 -0.382 $13,430
BMW $46,946 -0.490 -0.300 $16,759
BUICK $17,324 -0.468 -0.491 $4,691
CADILLAC $38,823 -0.598 -0.535 $7,264
CHEVROLET $14,794 -0.531 -0.349 $4,521
CHRYSLER $30,018 -0.649 -0.373 $6,602
DAEWOO $16,774 -0.748 -0.536 $1,962
DODGE $15,736 -0.562 -0.368 $4,355
FORD $15,106 -0.568 -0.367 $4,136
GEO $11,776 -0.378 -0.548 $3,309
GMC $25,439 -0.584 -0.271 $7,716
HONDA $32,704 -0.542 -0.360 $9,577
HUMMER $53,312 -0.378 -0.004 $33,022
HYUNDAI $21,268 -0.624 -0.537 $3,697
INFINITI $38,168 -0.551 -0.375 $10,711
ISUZU $8,699 -0.524 -0.393 $2,510
JAGUAR $41,442 -0.423 -0.368 $15,122
JEEP $26,571 -0.495 -0.393 $8,142
KIA $20,122 -0.646 -0.634 $2,603
LANDROVER $23,826 -0.371 -0.395 $9,074
LEXUS $39,736 -0.472 -0.296 $14,758
LINCOLN $34,430 -0.638 -0.296 $8,786
MAZDA $22,465 -0.514 -0.480 $5,670
MERCEDES $47,802 -0.363 -0.401 $18,226
MERCURY $16,576 -0.542 -0.459 $4,106
MITSUBISHI $20,036 -0.513 -0.371 $6,141
NISSAN $26,919 -0.520 -0.350 $8,399
OLDSMOBILE $18,170 -0.398 -0.579 $4,604
PLYMOUTH $19,619 -0.527 -0.582 $3,875
PONTIAC $19,608 -0.499 -0.471 $5,187
PORSCHE $56,156 -0.223 -0.423 $25,202
SAAB $45,193 -0.644 -0.378 $10,002
SATURN $22,137 -0.631 -0.410 $4,822
SUBARU $26,294 -0.409 -0.402 $9,288
SUZUKI $11,943 -0.515 -0.461 $3,117
TOYOTA $27,699 -0.524 -0.278 $9,521
VOLKSWAGEN $42,087 -0.633 -0.405 $9,201
VOLVO $39,848 -0.568 -0.333 $11,484
Table 4.9 Estimated Depreciation for a Five-year, 60k Mile Vehicle
 
Appendix A includes the complete regression results for each of the individual makes but 
in the body of this paper, highlights of significant estimates are in order.  
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 9.623 9.483 9.498 9.512
(877.18) (233.195) (235.857) (235.761)
age -0.184 -0.161 -0.162 -0.163
(-62.943) (-39.093) (-39.728) (-39.613)
miles1k -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-43.45) (-14.129) (-14.153) (-14.255)
CYL4 -0.343 -0.426 -0.400 -0.383
(-39.33) (-6.261) (-5.942) (-5.69)
cyl8 0.451 0.466 0.468 0.467
(67.258) (23.575) (23.944) (24.012)
cyl10 0.428 0.45 0.447 0.445
(17.501) (8.134) (8.188) (8.18)
WHEEL4 0.096 0.176 0.171 0.173
(13.381) (9.457) (9.286) (9.429)
CONV 0.534
(28.729)
COUPENC 0.175
(15.957)
WAGON 0.003 -0.341 -0.359 -0.362
(0.118)* (-2.089) (-2.224) (-2.256)
VAN 0.374
(40.230)
PICKUP4D 0.462 0.45 0.439 0.432
(38.540) (11.035) (10.867) (10.737)
PICKUPEXT 0.482 0.45 0.446 0.434
(47.033) (9.967) (10.008) (9.725)
PICKUPREG 0.33 0.248 0.243 0.232
(28.210) (5.885) (5.843) (5.580)
SUV2D 0.399 0.32 0.305 0.296
(28.135) (6.604) (6.355) (6.185)
SUV4D 0.585 0.5 0.486 0.477
(61.918) (12.791) (12.551) (12.36)
DIESELENG 0.477
(26.132)
NOWNERS -0.032 -0.031 -0.031
(-2.761) (-2.667) (-2.666)
BANKFINANCE -0.062
(-3.798)
DEALER -0.056
(-4.002)
FLEETLEASE -0.190 -0.334 -0.726
(-9.478) (-5.248) (-5.317)
BANKFINANCEMILES -0.001
(-3.095)
DEALERMILES 0.003
(12.889)
FLEETLEASEMILES -0.002 0.002
(-3.505) (1.474)*
BANKFINANCEAGE 0.037
(7.197)
DEALERAGE -0.007
(-2.016)
FLEETLEASEAGE 0.076 0.048
(10.687) (1.902)*
N 15,645 1,071 1,071 1,071
R-Sq 0.858 0.841 0.845 0.847
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses. All coefficients are significant at the 5% level except for those indicated by '*'.
Table 4.10 Coefficients of Interest for Ford Sample (Dependent Var is Log Price)
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A random sampling of over 1,000 Ford vehicles was collected to test the effects of 
ownership within the models. Ownership is a continuous variable that is defined as the number of 
times the vehicle changed ownership. Within the random sample, the minimum number was 1 
owner and the maximum number of owners was 6. The average over the entire sample is 1.5 
owners and the standard deviation is 0.75.  
The number of owners (NOWNERS) as an independent variable kept the R^2 around 
0.85 from the unrestricted Ford regression. But, the inclusion of NOWNERS produces some 
noticeable effects from the SELLER variables. There are virtually no statistically significant 
effects from dealers or Bank/Finance sellers but there is a statistically significant effect from 
Fleet/Lease sellers. Also, in the model without an ownership variable, the depreciation effects 
from age and Fleet/Lease were higher. All Ford models have both favorable F-statistics and t-
statistics. 
It is fairly clear that the information that is gleaned from auction buyers about who is 
selling the vehicle is important to them. Although the ability to test drive the vehicles before they 
hit the auction block has improved the symmetry of information, there still remains uncertainty 
about the vehicle. Perhaps the Lemon problem is smaller than it was before buyers could “kick 
the tires” before they had to make a decision to purchase. Nevertheless, the risk of significant 
asymmetry of information has buyers looking for quality signals from previous ownership data. 
As illustrated in earlier chapters, many believe that there will be a winner’s curse and 
adverse selection in the market with asymmetric information. A possible solution to the 
challenges of the lemon problem and adverse selection is for the seller to emit a signal of quality. 
One signal of quality is that of prior ownership. 
 In order to test the significance of ownership as a proxy for quality, a model was run with 
the entire set of Fords, then a second model was run on the random sample of Fords without 
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ownership data; finally, a third model was created which included the ownership variable. 
Running and retrieving the F statistic for the restricted model and the unrestricted model allowed 
the null hypothesis to be rejected. 
Testing for adverse selection is equivalent to a null hypothesis that the estimated 
coefficients for the ownership variables are equal to zero and hence, there is no sign of adverse 
selection. The alternative hypothesis is that the coefficients differ significantly from zero and that 
there is evidence for adverse selection. The p-value of the likelihood ratio statistic is 0.10, which 
allows for the null hypothesis of no adverse selection to be rejected.54 An F-test for the hypothesis 
that all coefficients are zero is rejected at the one percent level for most models. As auctions 
continue to provide arbitration and consignors continue to permit inspections, we expect that the 
lemon problem will be contained, but not obliterated. 
                                               
54
 The likelihood ratio statistic is twice the difference in the log-likelihood function evaluated under the null 
hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis. 
 66 
CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
 
 
The auction environment is a paradise for observing and testing the lemon hypothesis. 
This paper analyzed the effects of multiple-ownership on the winning bid and tested the 
hypothesis that a single-owner vehicle will command a premium over a multiple-owner vehicle; 
moreover, this premium increases with age. In the end, this model suggests that the premium on a 
new car is for more than just that quintessential smell. It is for the comfort of being confident that 
no previous owner has mistreated the vehicle. However, we expect that as asymmetric 
information dissipates between buyer and seller, the premium will diminish.  
Given the structure of the auction environment, there still are many intriguing areas for 
further research. Many topics within Industrial Organization could be tested within this 
environment, such as vertical integration between transport companies and the auction house, 
compensation structures for auctioneers, optimal time and position in the auction line-up, and 
search models for the retail dealer. As auctions disseminate more and more information and 
sellers dissipate risks of adverse selection, the wholesale auction environment will become even 
closer to the perfect competition model. Asymmetric information between buyer and seller still 
remains, but the relative ease for minimizing the risk of purchasing the “lemon” is done away by 
the very real possibility of purchasing the “peach.”  
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Appendix A 
 
Individual Regression Results for Individual Makes 
 
Variable Acura Audi BMW Buick Cadillac Chevy Chrysler Daewoo
INTERCEPT 10.547 10.724 10.757 9.76 10.567 9.602 10.31 9.728
(232.185) (182.477) (241.614) (190.044) (154.007) (558.715) (260.599) (24.488)
AGE -0.097 -0.16 -0.145 -0.135 -0.201 -0.164 -0.235 -0.322
(-6.876) (-8.375) (-10.878) (-10.492) (-14.975) (-38.843) (-19.8) (-2.926)
MILES1K -0.012 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.013 -0.007 -0.008 -0.013
(-11.858) (-6.11) (-5.457) (-9.907) (-10.769) (-27.378) (-9.562) (-3.243)
CYL4 -0.419 -0.245 -0.256 -0.781 0 -0.467 -0.317 -0.337
(-14.864) (-13.564) (-6.724) (-8.639) (0) (-37.265) (-10.479) (-1.347)
CYL8 0.344 0.338 0.381 0.391 0.59 0.529
(11.902) (19.144) (4.284) (8.769) (57.652) (2.508)
CYL10 0.419
(3.888)
WHEEL4 0.114 0.104 0.135 0.084 0.108
(1.973)* (4.298) (0.537) (0.782) (9.534)
CONV 1.297 0.235 0.158 0.544 0.115
(4.674) (6.07) (7.415) (19.491) (4.036)
COUPENC 0.015 0.305 -0.004 0.202 0.089 0.24 -0.022 -0.385
(0.559)* (7.815) (-0.15) (3.246) (1.991) (15.702) (-0.621) (-1.685)
WAGON 0.05 -0.13 -0.122 -0.189 0.12
(2.072) (-2.346) (-0.832) (-2.414) (0.47)
VAN 0.231 0.246
(14.876) (10.391)
PICKUP4D 0.265
(10.954)
PICKUPEXT 0.407
(26.164)
PICKUPREG 0.207
(12.428)
SUV2D 0.213
(7.897)
SUV4D 0.3 0.273 0.451
(1.831) (2.619) (30.478)
DIESELENG 0.213
(3.362)
GM
NONGM
BANKFINANCE -0.101 -0.155 0.061 0.154 -0.308 -0.049 -0.196 0.2
(-1.236)* (-2.206) (-1.123) (-1.324) (-3.17) (-1.677) (-2.186) (-0.303)
DEALER 0.063 0.142 -0.02 0.223 -0.15 -0.094 -0.052 1.039
(-1.123)* (-2.206) (-0.434) (-3.267) (-2.195) (-4.662) (-1.068) (-1.886)
FLEETLEASE -0.041 0.62 0.065 0.047 -0.348 -0.101 -0.34 -0.52
(-0.212)* (0.426) (0.16) (0.459) (-2.176) (-2.792) (-3.791) (-0.515)
BANKFINANCEMILES 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.01
(3.729) (0.724) (0.24) (2.117) (-2.1) (-1.321) (1.005)
DEALERMILES 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.009
(3.886) (0.785) (0.679) (1.439) (2.601) (-3.453) (-0.579) (1.234)
FLEETLEASEMILES 0.012 -0.023 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.003 -0.027
(1.615)* (-0.584) (-0.961) (-0.206) (-6.807) (-1.321) (-1.282)
BANKFINANCEAGE -0.014 0.039 -0.021 0.007 0.048 0.041 0.08 -0.121
(-0.598)* (1.69) (-1.203) (0.193) (2.052) (4.804) (2.933) (-0.53)
DEALERAGE -0.041 -0.035 -0.011 -0.014 0.028 0.056 0.038 -0.338
(-2.537) (-1.731) (-0.781) (-0.98) (1.986) (12.057) (2.866) (-1.872)
FLEETLEASEAGE -0.111 0.088 0.044 0.013 0.096 0.112 0.106 0.341
(-0.948)* (0.325) (0.666) (0.221) (1.980) (12.524) (3.862) (0.994)
N 736 519 1,138 948 828 8,274 1,410 119
R-Sq 0.881 0.918 0.898 0.815 0.895 0.825 0.834 0.513
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Variable Dodge Geo GMC Honda Hyundai Infinity Isuzu Jaguar
INTERCEPT 9.664 9.374 10.144 10.395 9.965 10.55 9.071 10.632
(625.308) (50.675) (258.469) (307.067) (188.851) (236.344) (74.51) (389.908)
AGE -0.18 -0.1 -0.193 -0.17 -0.218 -0.174 -0.161 -0.116
(-36.4) (-3.604) (-24.577) (-20.339) (-7.505) (-13.501) (-9.316) (-14.015)
MILES1K -0.008 -0.013 -0.005 -0.007 -0.013 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(-25.17) (-6.568) (-10.975) (-14.304) (-7.008) (-9.642) (-7.303) (-11.033)
CYL4 -0.35 -0.151 -0.327 -0.223 -0.392 -0.266 -0.299
(-28.922) (-0.873) (-8.684) (-11.33) (-10.878) (-6.294) (-6.734)
CYL8 0.252 0.532 0.304 0.257 0.154
(15.798) (29.957) (10.285) (0.818) (10.089)
CYL10 0.46 0.189
(8.107) (2.987)
WHEEL4 0.232 0.098 0.156 0.213 -0.03 0.153 0.052
(17.28) (1.61) (8.889) (4.86) (-0.247) (2.386) (1.602)
CONV 1.446 0.561 0.415
(11.378) (7.729) (17.126)
COUPENC 0.053 -0.477 -0.017 -0.199 0.241
(1.925) (-6.898) (-1.102) (-4.365) (2.986)
WAGON 0.19 0.038
(1.993) (0.223)
VAN 0.309 -0.256 0.266
(23.55) (-8.396) (6.59)
PICKUP4D 0.45 -0.16
(20.591) (-3.082)
PICKUPEXT 0.493 -0.128 0.465
(24.657) (-6.585) (2.632)
PICKUPREG 0.303 -0.241 0.462
(15.136) (-9.153) (3.731)
SUV2D 0.086 -0.321 0.743
(1.24) (-7.156) (5.982)
SUV4D 0.419 0.404 -0.049 0.416 0.045 0.905
(18.258) (6.933) (-1.237) (5.729) (0.72) (8.176)
DIESELENG 0.657 0.253
(21.53) (3.049)
GM
NONGM
BANKFINANCE 0.018 0.058 -0.146 -0.139 -0.141 0.107 0.029 -0.098
(-0.586) (-0.413) (-2.28) (-2.213) (-0.916) (0.574) (-0.156) (-1.233)
DEALER -0.003 -0.005 -0.123 -0.091 0.004 0.008 -0.147 0.113
(-0.128) (-0.046) (-2.859) (-2.568) (-0.053) (-0.126) (-1.989) (-3.529)
FLEETLEASE -0.003 0.164 -0.105 -0.161 0.152 -0.095 -0.313 0.004
(-0.116) (0.147) (-0.88) (-1.214) (1.59) (-0.975) (-1.485) (0.021)
BANKFINANCEMILES 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001
(1.054) (-2.164) (1.109) (0.339) (0.343) (1.472) (0.647)
DEALERMILES 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(3.294) (2.949) (5.551) (1.382) (-0.72) (1.366) (-1.104)
FLEETLEASEMILES 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.066) (-0.716) (1.224) (0.744) (0.851) (-0.656) (-0.314)
BANKFINANCEAGE 0.006 -0.032 0.064 0.034 0.011 -0.034 -0.046 0.015
(0.677) (-0.657) (3.594) (1.705) (0.17) (-0.548) (-0.838) (0.846)
DEALERAGE 0.002 -0.05 0.039 -0.005 0.019 0.028 -0.02
(0.266) (-1.686) (4.316) (-0.531) (1.105) (1.35) (-2.084)
FLEETLEASEAGE 0.018 -0.057 0.053 0.012 -0.051 0.007 0.108 0.022
(1.335) (-0.210) (1.581) (0.360) (-0.914) (0.261) (1.578) (0.291)
N 6,018 426 1,489 2,320 766 456 492 605
R-Sq 0.860 0.834 0.874 0.864 0.823 0.916 0.840 0.921
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Variable Jeep Kia LandRover Lexus Lincoln Mazda Mercedes Mercury
INTERCEPT 10.188 9.91 10.079 10.59 10.447 10.02 10.775 9.716
(349.288) (155.266) (36.78) (372.115) (226.166) (278.217) (293.245) (411.954)
AGE -0.147 -0.233 -0.097 -0.137 -0.227 -0.156 -0.095 -0.17
(-17.713) (-8.787) (-3.186) (-16.909) (-19.807) (-13.786) (-14.927) (-17.048)
MILES1K -0.008 -0.017 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.009 -0.01
(-15.679) (-11.01) (-3.229) (-10.183) (-9.319) (-13.655) (-12.641) (-15.698)
CYL4 -0.152 -0.574 -0.736 -0.324 -0.326 -0.516
(-4.885) (-10.814) (-3.261) (-12.311) (-15.908) (-15.868)
CYL8 0.242 0.387 0.354 0.192 0.357 0.409
(15.652) (9.514) (24.872) (6.024) (23.824) (24.364)
CYL10 0.605
(8.402)
WHEEL4 0.045 0.129 -0.003 0.075 0.027 0.185 -0.14 0.013
(3.318) (2.525) (-0.009) (2.965) (0.823) (3.718) (-7.612) (0.307)
CONV -0.053 0.2 0 0.625 0.316 0
(-0.276) (4.345) (0) (12.514) (16.515) (0)
COUPENC 0.091 -0.086 -0.016 0.111 0.257
(2.018) (-1.788) (-0.261) (4.466) (11.837)
WAGON 0.186 -0.009 0.113 0.096
(1.571) (-0.205) (1.512) (2.099)
VAN 0.465
(19.733)
PICKUP4D
PICKUPEXT 0.312
(7.069)
PICKUPREG 0.19
(3.872)
SUV2D 0.112 0.402 0.222
(5.42) (3.347) (1.568)
SUV4D 0.583 0.112 0.471 0.34 0.406
(13.219) (4.445) (16.53) (5.256) (9.953)
DIESELENG 0.007
(0.103)
GM
NONGM
BANKFINANCE -0.032 -0.328 0.316 -0.029 -0.098 -0.075 0.015 0.064
(-0.633) (-2.398) (-2.727) (-0.552) (-1.624) (-0.827) (-0.312) (-1.612)
DEALER -0.034 -0.282 0.03 -0.003 -0.112 -0.13 -0.032 0.111
(-0.959) (-3.219) (-0.574) (-0.107) (-2.245) (-2.994) (-0.807) (-2.961)
FLEETLEASE 0.13 -0.278 0.517 0.14 -0.05 -0.171 0.223 -0.033
(1.732) (-1.879) (1.473) (0.821) (-0.658) (-2.406) (1.087) (-0.804)
BANKFINANCEMILES 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001
(0.859) (1.916) (1.219) (-2.176) (0.747) (4.568) (1.028)
DEALERMILES 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.001 0.004
(2.935) (3.398) (1.786) (1.077) (-4.418) (4.747) (0.7) (5.15)
FLEETLEASEMILES -0.003 0.004 -0.01 0.005 -0.004 0.004
(-1.445) (0.746) (-4.301) (1.638) (-1.524) (2.703)
BANKFINANCEAGE 0.013 0.056 -0.059 -0.008 0.056 0.006 -0.038 -0.004
(0.874) (1.121) (-1.488) (-0.532) (2.783) (0.178) (-3.883) (-0.247)
DEALERAGE -0.004 0.038 -0.072 -0.005 0.073 -0.006 0.003 -0.04
(-0.39) (1.104) (-2.174) (-0.493) (5.936) (-0.439) (0.421) (-3.635)
FLEETLEASEAGE -0.011 0.050 -0.033 0.089 0.006 -0.022 -0.048
(-0.431) (0.692) (-0.674) (2.676) (0.142) (-0.534) (-2.393)
N 2,364 623 415 992 1,547 1,410 1,533 2,084
R-Sq 0.831 0.779 0.772 0.907 0.853 0.838 0.872 0.885
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Variable Mitsub Nissan Oldsmobile Pontiac Porsche Saab Saturn Subaru
INTERCEPT 9.905 10.201 9.808 9.884 10.936 10.719 10.005 10.177
(309.679) (508.73) (123.212) (324.938) (121.431) (177.546) (151.662) (111.046)
AGE -0.155 -0.159 -0.107 -0.149 -0.052 -0.232 -0.222 -0.111
(-11.668) (-23.518) (-6.307) (-16.844) (-2.23) (-19.682) (-11.274) (-6.122)
MILES1K -0.008 -0.007 -0.015 -0.011 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009
(-8.385) (-14.858) (-9.642) (-17.718) (-4.024) (-8.409) (-7.708) (-6.823)
CYL4 -0.484 -0.478 -0.189 -0.418 -0.673 -0.094 -0.379 -0.245
(-21.615) (-33.094) (-4.078) (-25.012) (-6.015) (-2.179) (-9.62) (-2.826)
CYL8 0.317 0.396 -0.885
(3.314) (8.285) (-3.62)
CYL10
WHEEL4 0.038 0.079 0.046 0.118 0.208
(1.166) (3.286) (0.136) (0.341) (6.876)
CONV 0.613 0.657 0.377 0.367 0.272
(12.054) (7.144) (0.999) (8.275) (10.665)
COUPENC 0.142 0.022 0.054 0.057 0.032 0.212
(6.686) (0.639) (0.976) (3.193) (0.473) (7.586)
WAGON 0.147 0.133 0.176 0.194
(0.571) (0.62) (3.38) (3.997)
VAN -0.01 0.382 0.19
(-0.374) (4.12) (7.133)
PICKUP4D -0.019
(-0.495)
PICKUPEXT 0.155
(5.109)
PICKUPREG 0.193 0.041
(1.168) (0.978)
SUV2D 0.087
(0.465)
SUV4D 0.214 0.127 0.559 0.021 0.099 -0.069
(6.666) (5.429) (1.67) (0.295) (0.308) (-2.326)
DIESELENG
GM
NONGM
BANKFINANCE -0.103 0.008 0.018 0.09 -0.765 0.026 0.01 0.145
(-0.932) (-0.102) (-0.111) (-1.526) (-2.635) (-0.009) (-0.103) (-0.894)
DEALER 0.101 -0.002 0.053 0.163 0.032 -0.24 -0.207 0.572
(-2.501) (-0.057) (-0.548) (-4.254) (-0.313) (-2.494) (-2.962) (-9.372)
FLEETLEASE -0.1 -0.081 0.227 0.086 -0.346 -11.137 -0.092 -0.228
(-2.539) (-2.223) (1.686) (1.339) (-0.399) (-1.139) (-0.473) (-0.918)
BANKFINANCEMILES -0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.001 0.009 0.003 -0.002 0.002
(-0.39) (-1.329) (1.963) (0.695) (1.624) (0.04) (-1.36) (0.037)
DEALERMILES 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 0.001
(1.501) (0.981) (2.493) (3.328) (-1.201) (-1.372) (-0.365) (0.81)
FLEETLEASEMILES 0.005 -0.002 0.005 -0.002 0.037 0.254 0.002 0.001
(3.289) (-2.618) (1.125) (-1.091) (1.599) (1.128) (0.572) (0.003)
BANKFINANCEAGE 0.047 0.02 -0.049 0.008 0.09 0.041 -0.012
(1.164) (0.877) (-1.221) (0.465) (1.461) (1.215) (-0.249)
DEALERAGE -0.011 0.005 -0.034 -0.03 0.033 0.078 0.083 -0.132
(-0.695) (0.606) (-1.8) (-2.903) (1.351) (3.855) (3.812) (-6.162)
FLEETLEASEAGE -0.039 0.060 -0.163 0.007 -0.209 0.012 0.079
(-1.616) (4.159) (-2.634) (0.281) (-1.437) (0.203) (0.658)
N 2,057 2,896 362 2,573 241 381 906 575
R-Sq 0.793 0.868 0.845 0.819 0.675 0.862 0.831 0.878
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Variable Suzuki Toyota Volkswgn Volvo
INTERCEPT 9.388 10.229 10.647 10.593
(222.404) (480.52) (171.245) (426.991)
AGE -0.156 -0.161 -0.224 -0.184
(-9.982) (-27.343) (-12.937) (-18.895)
MILES1K -0.01 -0.005 -0.009 -0.007
(-9.519) (-14.187) (-7.016) (-10.08)
CYL4 -0.081 -0.398 -0.22 -0.276
(-1.977) (-26.887) (-10.11) (-12.934)
CYL8 0.202 0.239
(6.74) (2.186)
CYL10
WHEEL4 0.044 0.196 0.136
(1.256) (8.99) (3.048)
CONV 0.474 0.238 0.557
(7.215) (7.261) (12.161)
COUPENC -0.039 -0.055 0.473
(-1.699) (-3.161) (6.772)
WAGON -0.169 0.065 0.124 0.32
(-1.609) (0.753) (2.723) (13.124)
VAN 0.198 0.023
(7.159) (0.285)
PICKUP4D 0.02
(0.284)
PICKUPEXT 0.107
(3.908)
PICKUPREG 0.018
(0.538)
SUV2D -0.111 0.211
(-0.859) (2.201)
SUV4D 0.537 0.304
(9.783) (14.062)
DIESELENG 0.037
(0.525)
GM
NONGM
BANKFINANCE -0.247 -0.236 -0.5 -0.028
(-2.361) (-3.611) (-7.131) (-0.268)
DEALER -0.037 0.009 -0.195 0.099
(-0.572) (0.381) (-2.942) (-2.225)
FLEETLEASE 0.247 -0.003 -0.431 -0.02
(2.042) (-0.084) (-3.077) (-0.149)
BANKFINANCEMILES -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.006
(-0.867) (-3.442) (1.159) (-1.445)
DEALERMILES 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.001
(1.924) (0.087) (2.055) (-1.69)
FLEETLEASEMILES 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.0001
(0.284) (-0.065) (0.69) (0.003)
BANKFINANCEAGE 0.093 0.093 0.105 0.048
(2.699) (7.412) (4.995) (1.386)
DEALERAGE -0.021 0.006 0.008 0.017
(-1.063) (0.888) (0.442) (1.554)
FLEETLEASEAGE -0.216 0.012 0.069 0.027
(-3.012) (0.686) (1.290) (0.437)
N 396 3,739 1,232 712
R-Sq 0.902 0.845 0.835 0.936
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Appendix B 
 
Manheim Auctions’ Worldwide Locations 
 
Name Location
166 Auto Auction Springfield, MO
Albuquerque Auto Auction Albuquerque, NM
Aloha Auto Auction Honolulu, HI
American Auto Auction North Dighton, MA
Arena Auto Auction Bolingbrook, IL
Arizona Auto Auction Phoenix, AZ
Atlanta Auto Auction College Park, GA
Auction Way Alsip, IL
Aycock Auto Auction Kenly , NC
Baltimore-Washington Auto Exchange Elkridge, MD
Bay Cities Auto Auction Hayward, CA
Big H Auto Auction Houston, TX
Bishop Brothers Auto Auction Atlanta, GA
Butler Auto Auction Cranberry Township, PA
California Auto Dealers Exchange Anaheim, CA
Caribbean Auto Dealers Exchange Bayamon, PR
Central Florida Auto Auction Orlando, FL
Cincinnati Auto Auction Hamilton, OH
Clantons Auto Auction Darlington, SC
Colorado Auto Auction Commerce City, CO
DRIVE Stockbridge, GA
Dallas Auto Auction Dallas, TX
Dallas Ft. Worth Auto Auction Ft. Worth, TX
Daytona Auto Auction Daytona Beach, FL
Dealers Auto Auction of Dallas Grand Prairie, TX
Denver Auto Auction Aurora, CO
Detroit Auto Auction Carleton, MI
Florida Auto Auction of Orlando Ocoee, FL
Fort Wayne Vehicle Auction Fort Wayne, IN
Fort Worth Vehicle Auction Ft. Worth, TX
Fowles Auction Group Melbourne, AU
Fredericksburg Auto Auction Fredericksburg, VA
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Name Location
Fresno Auto Dealers Auction Fresno, CA
Gateway Auto Auction Granite City, IL
Georgia Dealers Auto Auction Atlanta, GA
Greater Auto Auction of Phoenix Tolleson, AZ
Greater Chicago Auto Auction Matteson, IL
Greater Las Vegas Auto Auction Las Vegas, NV
Greater Nevada Auto Auction Las Vegas, NV
Greater New Orleans Auto Auction Slidell, LA
Greater Tampa Bay Auto Auction Tampa, FL
Harrisonburg Auto Auction Harrisonburg, VA
Hatfield Auto Auction Hatfield, PA
Imperial Auto Auction Lakeland, FL
Kansas City Auto Auction Kansas City, MO
Keystone Auto Auction Grantville, PA
LA Dealer Auto Auction Rosemead, CA
Lafayette Auto Auction Scott, LA
Lakeland Auto Auction Lakeland, FL
Lauderdale-Miami Auto Auction Davie, FL
Louisville Auto Auction Clarksville, IN
Manheim Auto Auction Manheim, PA
Manheim's El Paso Auto Auction El Paso, TX
Manheim France Bordeaux, FR
Manheim United Kingdom Leeds, UK
Manheim's Michigan Auto Auction Mt. Morris, MI
Metro Detroit Auto Auction Flat Rock, MI
Metro Milwaukee Auto Auction Caledonia, WI
Mid-America Auto Auction Louisville , KY
Minneapolis Auto Auction Maple Grove, MN
Mississippi Auto Auction Hattiesburg, MS
Nashville Auto Auction Mt. Juliet, TN
National Auto Dealers Exchange Bordentown, NJ
Newburgh Auto Auction Newburgh, NY
Northstar Auto Auction Shakopee, MN
Northway Exchange Auto Auction Clifton Park, NY
Ohio Auto Auction Grove City, OH
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  Appendix B  (Continued) 
 
Name Location
Omaha Auto Auction Omaha , NE
Orlando Orange Co Auto Auction Orlando, FL
Oshawa Dealers Exchange Courtice, ON
Pensacola Auto Auction Pensacola, FL
Portland Auto Auction Portland, OR
Remarketing Solutions Nashville, TN
Riverside Auto Auction Riverside, CA
San Antonio Auto Auction San Antonio, TX
San Diego Auto Auction Oceanside, CA
Skyline Auto Exchange Fairfield, NJ
Skyline Port Newark Facility Linden, NJ
South Seattle Auto Auction Kent, WA
Southern California Auto Auction Fontana, CA
St. Louis Auto Auction Bridgeton, MO
St. Pete Auto Auction Clearwater, FL
Statesville Auto Auction Statesville, NC
Tennessee Auto Auction Nashville, TN
Texas Hobby Auto Auction Houston, TX
Toronto Auto Auctions Milton, ON
Tucson Auto Auction Tucson, AZ
Utah Auto Auction West Bountiful, UT
West Palm Beach Auto Auction West Palm Beach, FL
 
Source: Manheim Used Car Market Report, 2004.
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  Appendix C 
  Sample Auction Schedule  
 
 
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Source: Manheim Auto Auction, Inc
Lane Start Time Assignment 
3 10:00 AM Fleet/Lease 
4 10:00 AM Fleet/Lease 
5 10:00 AM Independent Dealer Express 
6 10:00 AM Independent Dealer Express 
7 10:15 AM 1999 and Older Domestics and Imports 
8 10:15 AM 2000 and Newer Domestics 
9 10:30 AM 2000 and Newer Imports 
10 10:30 AM Franchised Dealer Consignment 
11 10:30 AM Franchised Dealer Consignment 
12 10:30 AM Franchised Dealer Consignment 
13 10:00 AM Fleet/Lease 
14 9:30 AM Fleet/Lease 
15 10:00 AM Rental Accounts 
16 10:00 AM Fleet/Lease 
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  Appendix D 
  Sale Day Arbitradable Items 
Item SALE DAY ARBITRADABLE ITEMS  
  
“The following guarantees by the Seller apply for the day of sale only, unless 
announced differently at the time of sale.” 
1 
“Any single defect of a non-wearable item that has a wholesale repair cost of $500 or 
more is arbitratable. Single defects of less than $500 are deemed minor and not 
arbitratable.” 
2 “Air Conditioning - Compressor engagement is guaranteed.” 
3 “Engine Computers are guaranteed.”  
4 
“No major or excessive paint and body work on current calendar year vehicles and 
newer. Major or excessive paint and bodywork is defined as three or more panels. 
Bumpers are not included.”  
5 
“Supplemental restraint systems (SRS) are present on all vehicles manufactured with 
such ms. SRS warning lights, which are on or inoperative, must be announced.”  
6 All OEM or equivalent emission control equipment is present.  
7 
“Vehicles are sold subject to any and all visible defects - including, but not limited to -
body or hail damage, cracked windshields, etc.”  
8 “Replacement VINS must be announced.”  
9 “Vehicles 7 model years and newer without air conditioning must be announced.”  
 
Source: Manheim Auto Auction, Inc. 
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  Appendix E 
  Seven Day Arbitradable Items 
Item SEVEN DAY ARBITRADABLE ITEMS  
  
“All consigned vehicles must disclose if any of the following apply or if the 
vehicles have any of the following defects, conditions or discrepancies that were not 
disclosed or announced at the time of the sale, regardless of "Light" conditions or 
guarantee offered, must be reported to the Auction within 7 days after the vehicle 
was sold at the Auction, in order to be eligible for arbitration. Vehicles must be 
returned to the Auction in the same or better condition than when purchased. 
Expense reimbursements will be at the sole discretion of the auction and will, at 
times, be limited to reasonable and documented expenses and transportation only. 
Lost profit, commissions, floor-plan expenses, etc. will not be reimbursed. Sale day 
is Day 1.”  
1 
“Frame/ Unibody Damage - Defined by the Auction with reference to the NAAA 
standards.”  
  
“Minor components welded or removed from frame (trailer hitches, 
bumpers, etc.) are not considered frame damage unless they have 
compromised the structural integrity of the vehicle.”  
  
“Lowered/ Raised vehicles must be announced and are subject to frame 
damage guarantees if frame is altered.”  
  
“Minor dents in frame/ structure that do not affect the structural integrity 
of the frame will not be considered frame damage.”  
2 
“Flood and Fire Damage - Defined by the Auction with reference to the NAAA 
standards.”  
3 “Fuel/ Engine Conversions and replacements- five year old vehicles and newer.” 
4 “Former taxis, government or municipal vehicles (open to the public)” 
5 
“Title and odometer discrepancies including: Not actual miles (TMU), broken 
odometers, Salvage titles, Previous Salvage, Titles, Theft Recoveries, and Flood/ 
Fire vehicles.”  
 
Source: Manheim Auto Auction, Inc. 
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  Appendix F 
  “As-Is” Vehicles 
Item AS IS VEHICLES - SOLD UNDER RED LIGHT  
 
“Vehicles that meet any one of the following conditions are sold "AS-IS" and are 
NOT subject to arbitration for ANY reason, except frame/unibody, title or odometer 
discrepancies unless specifically guaranteed by the Seller.” 
1 “Any vehicle announced "As-Is".”  
2 “Any vehicle sold for $3500.00 or less.”  
3 “All vehicles with more than 100,000 miles.”  
4 “Vehicles 10 years old or older.”  
5 
“Recreational vehicles, boats, buses, motorcycles, dune buggies, trailers, 
snowmobiles, jet skis, antiques, and kit cars.”  
6 “Push or tow through units.”  
7 “All taxis, government and municipal vehicles.”  
8 “Salvage/ Previous Salvage units.”  
9 “TMU/ Not actual mileage units.”  
10 “Theft recoveries.”  
11 “Flood/ Fire units.”  
12 “Donated charity vehicles.”  
 
Source: Manheim Auto Auction, Inc. 
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Appendix G 
Days on Retail Dealer Lot vs. Gross Profit 
$200
$650
$1,100
$1,550
$2,000
1-10 11-20 21-30 31-45 46-60 61-90 over 90
Days on the Lot
 
            Source: National Auto Dealers Association. 
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